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I. INTRODUCTION
Deep divisions exist among states over whether there is
any legal basis whatsoever for attacking Iraq in Operation Iraqi
Freedom. On the eve of the campaign, Secretary General Kofi
Annan said, "If the action is to take place without the support of
the Council, its legitimacy will be questioned and the support
for it will be diminished."'
In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush
said, "From this day forward, any nation that continues to har-
bor or support terrorism will be considered by the United States
as a hostile regime." Concerned about the connection between
nuclear weapons, rogue states, and terrorists, the President re-
leased his National Security Strategy in fall 2002. President
Bush said, "America will act against such emerging threats
before they are fully formed."2 He later announced that "the
policy of [the U.S.] government is the removal of Saddam [Hus-
sein]."3 Following the Azores summit meeting with the leaders
of the United Kingdom and Spain in March 2003, President
Bush said to reporters:
On this very day 15 years ago, Saddam Hussein launched a chemi-
cal weapons attack on the Iraqi village of Halabja. With a single
order, the Iraqi regime killed thousands of men and women and
children without mercy or without shame. Saddam Hussein has
proven he is capable of any crime. We must not permit his crimes
to reach across the world. Saddam Hussein has a history of mass
murder. He possesses the weapons of mass murder. He agrees-
1 Felicity Barringer, Eclipsed by Events, U.N. Officials Wonder About the
Past and Ponder the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A19.
2 Thomas Powers, The Man Who Would Be President of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2003, at Week in Review, 1, 7.
3 Allies Discuss Terrorism and the Middle East: Bush and Blair on Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at A14.
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he agreed to disarm Iraq of these weapons as a condition for end-
ing the Gulf War over a decade ago. The United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1441 has declared Iraq in material breach of its
longstanding obligations; demanded once again Iraq's full and im-
mediate disarmament; and promised serious consequences if the
regime refused to comply. The resolution was passed unani-
mously, and its logic is inescapable. The Iraqi regime will disarm
itself or the Iraqi regime will be disarmed by force. And the re-
gime has not disarmed itself.4
President Bush's intention to remove Saddam Hussein in
Operation Iraqi Freedom should come as no surprise. Hussein
has been a source of continued concern to the United States
since his invasion of Kuwait in 1990.5 Hussein has fostered ter-
rorism in sophisticated training camps and maintains relation-
ships with some of the most deadly international terrorist
organizations in the world.6 He has repeatedly terrorized his
own people and the international community since he seized
power in Iraq two decades ago. He has engaged in genocide
against his own people and has committed various transgres-
sions, ranging from the near total suppression of political free-
doms, to arbitrary arrest and detention, disappearance, torture
and execution of those who disagree with his policies. 7 For ex-
ample, he had his soldiers engage in the mass murder of
thousands of Kurds by lining them up and shooting them.8
In 1980, Iraq became the first state known to deploy chemi-
cal weapons in the seventy years since the end of World War 1.9
Iraq unleashed mustard agents on the Iranians through artil-
lery, helicopter, and airplane bombardments. 10 From 1987 to
4 Excerpts from Joint News Conference: 'Tomorrow Is a Moment of Truth,'
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, at A12 [hereinafter Excerpts].
5 5 See Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards a Doc-
trine of Anticipatory Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation Intervention, 15
FLA. J. INT'L L. 151, 153 (2002).
6 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 212.
7 See generally Human Rights Watch Policy on Iraq, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/iraqhrwpolicy.htm (for a very useful overview of
the abysmal record of human rights violations committed by Saddam Hussein).
Human Rights Watch is an organization that monitors human rights violations
around the world; Middle East Watch is a subsidiary division or committee of
Human Rights Watch.
8 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 159.
9 See id. at 157.
10 See id. 11 See id. at 158-59.
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1988, Hussein bombarded the Kurds with chemical weapons, in-
cluding sarin and VX, killing 200,000 and leaving nearly four
million people permanently blind, sterilized, disfigured, or un-
naturally prone to develop cancer and respiratory diseases.11 In
December 1990, prior to the commencement of Operation De-
sert Storm, Iraq used the diplomatic pause of last-round Secur-
ity Council negotiations to load twenty-five warheads and 166
aerial bombs with biological warfare agents.12 On the eve of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Iraqi regime summarily executed,
without trial, dozens of prisoners who had been detained as
"spies" at Abu Ghraib, one of the largest and most feared jails in
Iraq.13
There is compelling evidence that Saddam Hussein has ac-
quired quantities of bomb-grade uranium, has created a work-
ing nuclear weapon, and has the ability to fashion so-called
"dirty bombs."' 4 For some time, there has been compelling evi-
dence that Iraq has supported terrorist operations that target
the United States.' 5 In a report in 2002, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency said that Iraq had not accounted for 15,000 artil-
lery rockets.16 In the past, these rockets had been the preferred
means for delivering nerve agents.' 7 Iraq also has not ac-
counted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard
agent. 18 Hussein's bloody legacy, his disregard for the lives of
his own citizens, his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction,
and his support for international terrorism, clearly underscore
the concern that, to use the words of President Bush, "[w] e must
not permit his crimes to reach across the world."' 9
11
12 See Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of
the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's
compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687, U.N.
Doc. S/1995/864 (1991), at 29, para. 75(w).
13 Ian Fisher, As Hussein Faded, Prisoners Were Executed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 2003, at Al.
14 Posteraro, supra note 5, at 173-74.
15 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 180.
16 See Bernard Weinraub, A Nation at War: In the Field Intelligence; Army
Reports Iraq is Moving Toxic Arms To Its Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at B6.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 Excerpts, supra note 4, at A12.
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In President's Bush report to Congress justifying Operation
Iraqi Freedom, emphasis was laid on Iraq's link to terrorists:
Both because Iraq harbors terrorists and because Iraq could share
weapons of mass destruction with terrorists who seek them for
use against the United States, the use of force to bring Iraq into
compliance with its obligations under U.N.S.C. resolutions would
be a significant contribution to the war on terrorists of global
reach. A change in the current Iraqi regime would eliminate an
important source of support for international terrorist activities.
It would likely also assist efforts to disrupt terrorist networks and
capture terrorists around the globe. United States government
personnel operating in Iraq may discover information through
Iraqi government documents and interviews with detained Iraqi
officials that would identify individuals currently in the United
States and abroad who are linked to terrorist organizations. 20
Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld added, "Our goal
is to defend the American people, and to eliminate Iraq's weap-
ons of mass destruction, and to liberate the Iraqi people.'
President Bush also suggested that humanitarian intervention
to liberate the Iraqi people from a tyrannical regime was a fur-
ther justification for Operation Iraqi Freedom, when he said,
"We are coming with a mighty force to end the reign of your
oppressors." 22 A New York Times article referred to the Bush
Doctrine as a "new doctrine" of "preventive war."23
20 David E. Sanger & John F. Burns, U.S. Begins Attack With Strike at Bagh-
dad After Deadline For Hussein To Go Runs Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at Al,
A18.
21 Thorn Shanker & Eric Schmitt, Rumsfeld Says Iraq Is Collapsing, Lists 8
Objectives of War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at B2.
22 Adam Nagourney & David Sanger, A Nation at War: Political Debate; Bush
Defends Progress of War and is Cheered, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at Bi, B3.
Sometimes it is not entirely clear what motivates a government's action. If a gov-
ernment explains its motivation, as occurred with respect to Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, "it is still impossible to tell whether the explanation is accurate." Anthony
D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 Am. J.
INT'L L. 516, 520 (1990); see ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 34-39 (1971) [hereinafter D'AMATO].
Moreover, "[i]nternational lawyers may appropriately evaluate the actions
states undertake on the basis of customary international law irrespective of verbal
rationales proffered by the states themselves." D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama
Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 Am. J. INT'L L. at 520.
23 David E. Sanger, Threats and Responses: News Analysis; a New Doctrine
for War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at Al.
20031
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In this Article, I will argue that international law is in the
throws of a paradigm shift.24 A new legal norm of anticipatory
offensive intervention has emerged as a valid doctrine. This
type of intervention justifies action to literally attack and re-
place tyrannical regimes that foster international terrorism, en-
deavour to, or actually develop and maintain biological,
chemical, or nuclear weapons. 25 In order to gain widespread ac-
ceptance, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense needs to pro-
vide constraints to make clear that no nation has carte blanche
authority to deploy military force against a state that it sus-
pects of fostering international terrorism and of developing
weapons of mass destruction. 26
24 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 155-56. Scientists move from one "para-
digm" or theoretical framework, to another based on social and psychological fac-
tors, as well as experimental factors, as discussed in THOMAS KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1962). Even with scientific theories, their
acceptance in society has much to do with ephemeral factors such as politics, per-
sonal influence and historical chances. A paradigm shift occurs in science when a
scientific hypothesis no longer can be reconciled with observed phenomena or with-
stand interpretations of experimental results. If a general principle conflicts with
particular experimental results, then either the hypothesis should be modified to
explain those results or the mode of experimentation should be changed to ensure
that the results will support the hypothesis. When this is no longer possible, that
is, when a hypothesis or theory cannot be justified because there is simply over-
whelming contrary data, then the principle should be rejected. The conflicting
data, in turn, which at first may be regarded as a breach of, or an exception to, an
existing hypothesis, may well become the basis for a new hypothesis. Similarly, in
the context of customary international law, when a norm is no longer observed, or
if it subjected to a significant number of exceptions or its breach justified on cer-
tain rationalizations, it may be time to consider that the exceptions to the old norm
are becoming the seed of a new norm. See id.
25 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 155.
26 Christopher Clarke Posteraro has suggested a 6-pronged protocol: (1) pref-
erence for multilateral action; (2) existence of compelling evidence; (3) attempted
peaceful resolution; (4) proportionality; (5) non-conquest; and (6) reasonableness.
See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 205-207. Under this suggested protocol, "there
should be a strong preference for multilateral action ...... Id. at 205.
This suggested protocol is somewhat akin to earlier protocols suggested as
part of the generic remedy of self-defense. For example, the following three-part
protocol was advanced by Derek Bowett:
(1) The target state must be guilty of a prior international delinquency
against the claimant state.
(2) An attempt by the claimant state to obtain redress or protection by
other means must be known to have been made, and failed, or to be inap-
propriate or impossible in the circumstances.
(3) The claimant's use of force must be limited to the necessities of the
case and proportionate to the wrong done by the target state.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol15/iss2/1
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When science enters a new domain, it becomes necessary
for the language of rights to likewise undergo a paradigm shift
or else explain its theory consistent with technological ad-
vance.27 The unilateral force by a state or a "coalition of the
willing," without authorization from the U.N. Security Council,
is likely to be tolerated if there is compelling evidence that such
first-use was justified by the severe threat of another state's in-
direct aggression. 28 To prove this, an examination of the cur-
rent and emerging norms in customary international law
pertaining to the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, or pre-
ventive war, as a means of thwarting an ongoing or imminent
terrorist threat that converges with a tyrannical regime that
develops weapons of mass destruction must be made. To under-
stand the complexity of the problem, the content, methodology,
and evolution of customary international law must be ad-
dressed first. Customary international law is constantly evolv-
ing; the seeds of a new state practice can become the substance
of tomorrow's new custom.
The background of autonomous use of force under the U.N.
Charter necessitates a reference to the set of norms embodied in
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter that pertains to the right of self-
defense. The constraint on self-defense in Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter was never intended to supplant the inherent right
of states to deploy force in a variety of contexts pertaining to
anticipatory self-defense under customary international law. In
order to make this assumption, the following should be dis-
cussed: the evolving set of norms embodied in customary inter-
national law pertaining to the inherent right of self-defense, an
overview of international precedents, and reactions in the world
community to specific cases of anticipatory self-defense.
By and large, the community of states has acquiesced or
tolerated past cases of anticipatory self-defense. The justifica-
tion for the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense in the context of
Operation Iraqi Freedom has its strengths and weaknesses. An
Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3
(1972).
27 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 155.
28 Thomas Franck, The Institute for Global Legal Studies Inaugural Collo-
quium: The UN And The Protection Of Human Rights: When, If Ever, May States
Deploy Military Force Without Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 51, 54 (2001).
2003]
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analysis of the principle of proportionality in the context of self-
defense is necessary to show that customary international law
recognizes that self-defense need not always be "proportionate,"
and that retribution and reprisals are appropriate responses in
certain cases. 29 Inevitably, there is a question whether propor-
tionality can accommodate the goal of regime-change of a rogue
state. The use of force for humanitarian intervention, with its
concomitant objective of affecting a regime-change, has become
part of customary international law even in the absence of Se-
curity Council authorization, and therefore justifies the objec-
tive of Operation Iraqi Freedom: ousting the Iraqi regime. In
conclusion, a model showing how anticipatory self-defense can
be deployed with sufficient constraints so as to allay fears of
abuse will be provided.
A concrete international law doctrine under which the
United States could execute its campaign against Iraq does not
currently exist.30 The Bush Doctrine of anticipatory self-de-
fense, or preventive war, must be analyzed in view of geopoliti-
cal realities in a post-September 11th world. A state that
actively supports terrorists within its borders, or that simply
acquiesces and tolerates their encampments, poses a grave
threat to the security of other states. The focal point of concern
should be state support of terrorist cells, training camps, and
any other type of support, whether brief or extended. An added
concern pertains to rogue states or tyrannical regimes that de-
velop weapons of mass destruction, however advanced or nas-
cent their development, however small or large it's stockpiling.
In such cases, under the Bush Doctrine, there is reasonable jus-
tification to be concerned and to take remedial steps to ensure
that the situation is reversed.
II. THE CONTENT, METHODOLOGY, AND EVOLUTION OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
There is little precedent for a major U.S. military offensive
against a state that has not directly used force against U.S. in-
29 Michael C. Bonafede, Here, There, And Everywhere: Assessing The Propor-
tionality Doctrine And The U.S. Uses Of Force In Response To Terrorism After The
September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 155, 162 (2002).
30 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 155.
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terests. 31 The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense in the case of
Operation Iraqi Freedom has been criticized as a violation of in-
ternational law by states and legal commentators alike.
32
Many think that the Bush Doctrine is dangerous because they
view it as a first step on a slippery slope for new attacks of pre-
ventive war against other regimes, such as North Korea or
Iran.33 On the other hand, current international law governing
the use of force does not adequately address the threat posed by
rogue states such as Iraq that foster international terrorism
and pursue the development of weapons of mass destruction.
34
While the United States justified Operation Enduring Freedom
against the Taliban in Afghanistan based on customary norms
related to self-defense in response to an "armed attack," with
little or no dissent from other states,35 the nature of the threat
31 See id.
32 See Sanger, supra note 22, at Al; David E. Sanger, A Nation At War: Policy;
Viewing The War As A Lesson To The World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at B1 [here-
inafter Viewing The War As A Lesson To The World].
33 See Viewing The War As A Lesson To The World, supra note 31, at B1.
34 See generally Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of War: Self-Defense, Inherence,
and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 539, 548-52 (Spr. 2002).
35 Glennon, supra note 34, at 546. The United States' use of military force
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was not entirely free from criti-
cism. Some have argued that effecting a regime-change of the Taliban in Afghani-
stan was a "disproportionate" use of force. See id.
As an example of another criticism, a group of German international lawyers
at a conference claimed that the use of force was illegal based on the following
claims:
(1) It violates the Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits the use of
force except when authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII.
(2) Self-defense is not lawful after an armed attack has ended; that is, after
September 11, 2001.
(3) Self-defense can be exercised only against an attack by a state. Al Qaeda is
not a state government.
(4) Self-defense may be exercised only against an actual attacker. The Taliban
were not the attacker.
(5) Self-defense may be exercised only "until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary' to maintain international peace and security." Since the
Council took such measures in Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, the right of
self-defense had been superseded.
(6) The right of self-defense arises only upon proof that it is directed towards
the actual attacker. The United States failed to provide such evidence.
See Symposium, The United States and International Law-The Effects of
U.S. Predominance on the Foundations of International Law, Gottingen (Oct. 25-
27, 2001) (cited in Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 839 (2001)).
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in Iraq differs fundamentally from the circumstances in Af-
ghanistan.36 In Iraq, there was no armed attack against the
United States or evidence of a terrorist plot. There has been no
evidence that decisively links Iraq to either the September 11th
attacks or subsequent terrorism, such as the anthrax threat of
fall 2001. 37 It is inconclusive whether Al Qaeda maintained
training camps in Iraq or whether Iraq provided it with finan-
cial, logistical, or military support in contrast to the overwhelm-
ing evidence of such circumstances in Afghanistan. 38 The
United States never sought to justify its attack on Iraq as a di-
rect extension of its ongoing war in Afghanistan to uproot Al
Qaeda combatants. However, the attack on Iraq is not sui
generis39 in the annals of international law, and it carries with
it an aura of legitimacy based on precedents that quite plausi-
bly have become part of customary international law.40
Customary international law consists of international rules
that are not based on treaties or other explicit consent of
states.41 Today, customary international law is, together with
treaty law, one of the two central sources of international law. 42
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
ranks "international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law," as a notch lower in authoritativeness than
treaty law.4 3 Treaties, however, despite their considerable
number, leave many international topics untouched, and most
treaties are narrow in scope or are only supported by a few
states.44 Thus, in fields not touched upon by treaties, custom-
ary international law becomes an important, if not singular,
source of international law.
36 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 154.
37 See id. at 164.
38 But see R. James Woolsey, The Iraq Connection: Blood Baath, NEW REPUB-
LIC, Sept. 24, 2001, at 20; Jeffrey Goldberg, The Great Terror, THE NEW YORKER,
Mar. 25, 2002, at 52, 69 ("There's been a relationship between the Mukhabarat[Iraqi intelligence] and the people of Al Qaeda since 1992 .... ").
39 See Janadas Devan, Iraq's not Vietnam, but US has its hands full, THE
STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), July 18, 2003.
40 See generally Posteraro, supra note 5, at 179-184.
41 See 1945 I.C.J. STAT., art. 38(1)(b), as annexed to the Charter of the United
Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (signed at San Francisco, June
26, 1945; entered into force October 24, 1945).
42 See id.
43 Id. art. 38(1)(a) & (b).
44 See MARK W. JANis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (1993).
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Customary international law may sometimes be more
widely applicable to states than are rules arising from interna-
tional agreements. Because so much is left unregulated by
treaty, customary international law may sometimes have more
widespread application than treaty law. The U.S. Supreme
Court has said that a rule of customary international law is
often presumed to be a "universal law of society. '45 Several
questions arise from the Court's conclusion: What is the con-
tent of customary international law? How does a new interna-
tional custom sustain the momentum necessary to establish a
paradigm shift? How many states must practice or endorse a
new norm before it becomes customary international law? How
is it possible to distinguish between a state practice that vio-
lates customary international law and a state practice that re-
places old with new customary international law?
As to the content of customary international law, Grotius,
the founder of international law in the modern era, suggested
that "[t]he proof for the law of nations is similar to that for un-
written municipal law; it is found in unbroken custom and the
testimony of those who are skilled in it."46 According to another
classic commentator in the field, Vattel, the "customary law of
nations" consists of "certain maxims and customs consecrated
by long use, and observed by nations in their mutual inter-
course with each other as a kind of law."'4 7 One of the tradi-
tional criterions advanced for determining the content of
customary international law is "concordant practice by a num-
ber of States with reference to a type of situation falling within
the domain of international relations .... ",48 Justice Robert H.
Jackson, American Chief of Counsel for the prosecution of major
war criminals in the ad hoc International Military Tribunal of
Nuremberg, said:
International law is more than a scholarly collection of abstract
and immutable principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties or agree-
ments between nations and of accepted customs. But every cus-
45 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820).
46 H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES 44, § 14 (Kelsey trans.,
1925).
47 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS XV (1797).
48 International Law Commission, 1950 Y.B. INT'L L. 26.
2003]
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tom has its origin in some single act, and every agreement has to
be initiated by the action of some state. ... [W]e cannot deny that
our own day has its right to institute customs and to conclude
agreements that will themselves become sources of a newer and
strengthened International Law. [Innovations and revisions in
International Law are brought about by the action of govern-
ments designed to meet a change in circumstances. . . Hence I
am not disturbed by the lack of precedent for the inquiry we pro-
pose to conduct.49
Much of the law of nations has its roots in custom. 5 0 Cus-
tom must have a beginning; and customary usages of States
concerning national and personal liability for resort to prohib-
ited methods of warfare and to wholesale criminalism have not
been petrified for all time. "International law was not crystal-
lized in the seventeenth century, but is a living and expanding
code."51 The Statute of the International Court of Justice refers
to custom as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law."5 2
Custom itself generally is said to have two components: state
practice and a psychological component known as opiniojuris.53
State practice involves the general and consistent practices by
states, while opinio juris is defined as a kind of "state of mind"
on the part of states that a certain form of conduct is permissi-
ble, required, or mandated by international law.5 4 Opinio juris
refers to statements and declarations by states that articulate
the legality of practices in question.55 The element of opinio
juris is referred to in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law56 of the United States as "a sense of legal obliga-
49 Report of June 7, 1945, from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel
for the United States for the prosecution of Axis War Criminals, reprinted in 39
AM. J. INT'L L.. (Supp.) 178, 187 (1945). (Emphasis added).
50 See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Cus-
tomary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.757, 774 (2001).
51 Sheldon Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L.
REV. 396, 398, n. 6 (quoting from the author's book, WAR CRIMINALS: THEIR PROSE-
CUTION AND PUNISHMENT 14 (1944)) (citation omitted).
52 1945 I.C.J. STAT., art. 38(1)(b).
53 See Roberts, supra note 50, at 757.
54 See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW
29 (1982).
55 See Roberts, supra note 50, at 757.
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (American Law Institute 1987).
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tion.' '57 The notion of opinio juris explains how a state practice
tips in a certain way to become established as a rule of law be-
cause, as the International Court has held, "It]he states con-
cerned ... feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a
legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of
the acts is not in itself enough."58 We can ascertain whether a
state or a group of states regards a particular principle, such as
anticipatory self-defense, along the lines of the Bush Doctrine,
to be something rising to a legal right, by formal state expres-
sions of opinio juris.59 Clearly, the United States has enunci-
ated the doctrine as a formal expression of law via press
releases, statements of the President, diplomatic correspon-
dence, opinions expressed by official legal and policy advisers to
the President, policy statements, and in the conduct of foreign
relations. In addition, the voting patterns of the United States
in the U.N. Security Council and policy statements made on be-
half of the United States in the Security Council are formal
state expressions of opinio juris on the practice at issue.60
Some think that General Assembly resolutions and recom-
mendations of international non-government organizations are
evidence of the content of customary international law.61 Reso-
lutions and recommendations can be useful evidence of the con-
current attitudes by a number of states on a given legal topic.
Resolutions and recommendations of international organiza-
tions may be regarded as a sort of "soft" international law-"rules
which are neither strictly binding nor completely void of any
legal significance," 62 but which may some day solidify into cus-
tomary international law. The fact that the General Assembly
or the Security Council may be silent on a certain matter may
indicate that there is a lack of consensus on a given matter by a
majority of states represented therein.
How much a custom must change, or how long a change of
custom needs to persist, or how many states need to join the
"bandwagon," before a new custom may be said to become cus-
57 Id. § 102(2).
58 North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Reports 3, 44.
59 See Roberts, supra note 50, at 782.
60 See Roberts, supra note 50, at 785-87.
61 See JANIS, supra note 44, at 50 (1993).
62 BERNHARDT, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7 ENCY. PUB. INTL. L. 61, 62
(1984).
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tomary international law is a question not susceptible to precise
analysis:
Customs can generally change and harden over time because cus-
tom is a fluid source of law. The content of custom is not fixed; it
can develop and change in light of new circumstances. The forma-
tion and modification of custom is an uncertain process because
international law lacks an authoritative guide as to the amount,
duration, frequency, and repetition of state practice required to
develop or change a custom. 6 3
Custom lacks clear rules of change, rather it develops
through a "slow process of growth, whereby courses of conduct
once thought optional become first habitual or usual, and hence
obligatory, and the converse process of decay, when deviations,
once severely dealt with, are first tolerated and then pass unno-
ticed."64 Once a given state practice becomes customary, it rises
to legitimacy and legality. In order for a particular act of state
to enter the domain of customary international law, it will need
to become "authoritative state practice."65 In order for a partic-
ular norm to enter the domain of authoritative state practice, it
must first be practiced by a state. There is always a first move
in a paradigm shift. Once a paradigm shift is made, all others
can follow in its wake and endorse the new state practice.
What exactly causes a norm to lose its quality as law? The
onset of a new approach in state practice is open to interpreta-
tion, either as a breach of past custom or as a new state practice
may signal the start of a new trend. "For example, NATO's in-
tervention in Kosovo could be interpreted as a breach of an ex-
isting customary prohibition on intervention or as the seed for a
new custom allowing humanitarian intervention."66 A custom-
ary rule loses its normative quality because it is widely ignored,
particularly over a significant period of time in a variety of con-
texts. This is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to sug-
gest that the practice no longer has sufficient international
consensus. The fact that a majority of states ignore a norm of
63 Roberts, supra note 50, at 784.
64 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 90 (1961).
65 ANTHONY CLARK AREND, Towards an Understanding of International Legal
Rules, INTERNATIONAL RULES 300 (Robert J. Beck et al. ed., 1996) (emphasis
omitted).
66 Roberts, supra note 50, at 776.
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customary international law does not necessarily imply that the
rule is no longer customary. For example, it is clearly part of
customary international law that torture is prohibited. No
state denies the existence of this norm, and it is widely recog-
nized as customary international law in national courts.67 But
it is well known from reports of Amnesty International that a
significant majority of states systematically engage in torture.68
Does this non-compliance have sufficient relevance to overturn
the prevailing prohibition of torture under customary interna-
tional law? The answer is that new norms require both practice
and opinio juris before they can become new norms of custom-
ary international law.69 The reason why the prohibition
against torture continues is that even though it is widely
abused, its normative status continues to exist because of opinio
juris.70 No state that engages in torture believes that the inter-
national law prohibition against torture is wrong or that they
are not bound by the prohibition.71 A new norm cannot emerge
without both practice and opinio juris, and an old practice does
not cease without the majority of states engaging in both con-
trary practice and withdrawing their opinio juris.72
A shift in customary international law can occur quickly,
"particularly if the rule was uncertain or still developing ....
Customs can develop or change in light of the recognition of new
moral considerations in international law. ' 73 According to some
commentators, even "a single precedent could be sufficient to
create international custom. ' '74 For example, it has been
pointed out that the principle of national sovereignty over air-
space arose as a norm of customary international law "at the
67 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
68 For an excellent discussion of the prohibition of torture under international
law and the empirical evidence that shows the widespread evidence of the use of
torture by state governments; see Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The Interna-
tional Law of Torture: From Universal Proscription to Effective Application and
Enforcement, 14 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 86, 88-90 (2001).
69 See Roberts, supra note 50, at 762-63.
70 See id. at 769.
71 See id. at 764-65.
72 See id. at 762-63.
73 Id. at 785.
74 D'AMATO, supra note 22, at 58 (quoting Gilberto Amado).
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moment the 1914 war broke out."75 The advent of aircraft was
a sudden and new phenomenon, bringing to focus the topic of
airspace that states had never undertaken with earnest before.
Another example pertains to the establishing of new norms in
the Nuremberg Tribunal, for example, "[tihe fact that a person
who committed an act which constitutes a crime under interna-
tional law acted as Head of State or responsible Government
official does not relieve him from responsibility under interna-
tional law."76 This and other "Nuremberg Principles" became
principles of customary international law at the moment they
were announced.7 7 The fact that we live in a post-September
75 Id. (quoting James L. Brierly). There had been an earlier effort to deal with
aerial warfare by banning the launching of projectiles from balloons in the Hague
Convention of 1899.
76 Resolution affirming the Principles of International Law Recognized by the
Charter of the Tribunal, and the spelling out of these principles by the Interna-
tional Law Commission of 1950, Res. 9(1) 1946.
77 According to one commentator, one of the objectives of the Nuremberg Tri-
als was to lay down the rule of individual accountability:
Henceforth, no matter how exalted your position, whether you were cap-
tains, kings, presidents, prime ministers, secretaries of parties, heads of
parlor bureaus, military chieftains, bankers industrialists, no matter how
exalted, Justice Jackson [American Chief of Counsel of the Nuremberg
Trials] said, 'We will give you short shrift, a long rope, and into your
hands, we will pass the poisoned chalice.'.. . In other words, if war comes,
.. [n]o longer does exalted status confer immunity.
Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Recalling the War Crimes Trials of World War II, 149
MIL. L. REV. 15, 16-17 (1995). According to another commentator,
In neither the Tokyo nor the Nuremberg Trials was it sufficient for the
defence to show that the acts of responsible officers or of government min-
isters and officials were protected as "acts of state." The twin principles of
individual criminal responsibility and of universal jurisdiction in the pros-
ecution and punishment of war criminals were firmly established.
R. John Pritchard, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Its
Contemporary Resonances," 149 MIL. L. REV. 25, 33 (1995). Yet another commen-
tator has this to say:
Nuremberg was a historical landmark in other respects as well. It
marked the start of the international human rights movement because it
was the first international adjudication of human rights. Its effect in this
respect is felt throughout the world in the United Nations Genocide Con-
vention, the United Nations Universal Bill of Rights, American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, and above all, the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Henry T. King, Jr., The Nuremberg Context From the Eyes of a Participant, 149
MIL. L. REV. 37, 46 (1995). A further comment by another commentator is this:
The judges at Nuremberg were concerned that the proceedings be seen as
the enforcement of legal norms, not simply a process of the victors punish-
ing the vanquished. . . . The defendants argued that the old legal system
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol15/iss2/1
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11th world compels "the recognition of new moral considera-
tions in international law. s78 Today, the formation of a new
custom occurs faster than ever before, "every event of interna-
tional importance is universally and immediately known."7 9
According to Anthony D'Amato, the action of a state in
breach of customary international law can be viewed as a seed
for new law because the state acts both as a legislator of inter-
national law and as the subject of the law it creates.80 "What is
now an exception to, or a breach of, an accepted rule may later
become integral to the explanation of a new general rule."8'
D'Amato also asserts:
When a state violates an existing rule of customary international
law, it undoubtedly is "guilty" of an illegal act, but the illegal act
itself becomes a disconfirmatory instance of the underlying rule.
The next state will find it somewhat easier to disobey the rule,
until eventually a new line of conduct will replace the original
rule by a new rule.8 2
As such, customary international law is "entirely phenome-
nological; it does not 'exist' apart from the way representatives
of states perceive it."83
Another point concerning customary international law in-
volves acquiescence of a custom by other states.8 4 Whether a
protected them against punishment, an argument that had proven effec-
tive in the war crimes trials held at the end of World War I. Although
that argument may seem nonsensical to us today, it was not a trivial ar-
gument in its time .... We need not re-examine that claim today. But we
should be cautious against assuming that what is true today has always
been true. The decision at Nuremberg built on and confirmed the growing
changes in international law, but it represented a turning point for indi-
vidual responsibility and for international law .... The rejection of the
"superior orders" defense is of necessity based on the presumption of an
applicable legal order outside of and beyond the nation state. This, in it-
self is the most important sign of transformation of the paradigm that was
being made.
Fred L. Morrison, The Significance of Nuremberg for Modern International Law,
149 MIL. L. REV. 207, 212 (1995)
78 Roberts, supra note 50, at 785.
79 D'AMATO, supra note 22, at 58 (quoting Mateesco).
80 See D'AMATO, supra note 22, at 97-98.
81 Roberts, supra note 50, at 784.
82 D'AMATO, supra note 22, at 97.
83 Id. at 34 (citing HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION To PURE PHENOM-
ENOLOGY (1931)).
84 See Roberts, supra note 50, at 767.
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"seed" for new law actually produces a shift in customary inter-
national law depends in part upon the reactions of other
states.8 5 Whether acts of states occur in the past, or these
states claim that they are entitled to act in a particular way,
can be evidence of a rule of customary international law.8 6 For
example, states can indicate whether they concur with, or pro-
test the legality of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, as in
the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The acts of anticipatory
self-defense pursuant to the Bush Doctrine may modify existing
customary international law if other states emulate the action
or acquiesce in its legality. Are other states protesting, or to
what extent are states acquiescing, or even actively endorsing
the nascent rule? How many states must endorse anticipatory
self-defense under the circumstances of Operation Iraqi Free-
dom in order for the practice to become a customary norm?
There is no litmus test.
The types of assistance may measure the degree of acquies-
cence or outright support by states of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Making its territory or air space available for the military oper-
ations of other states is an affirmative stand on the underlying
justness of the action. Serious international responsibilities at-
tach to a state's permitting its territory and air space to be used
by the military forces of other states. The U.N. General Assem-
bly's "Definition of Aggression" Resolution provides that "the ac-
tion of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at
the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State" quali-
fies as an "act of aggression" in violation of Article 2(4), provid-
ing that all states "refrain ... from the threat or use of force."87
Some states, including Germany and France, have allowed
overhead flight rights for allied warplanes heading for Iraq
even as they have assailed the war itself 88 If a state offers its
air space to the U.S. and coalition forces, it ought to be con-
vinced that military operations are supported by a bona fidejus
85 Id. at 784.
86 See AKEHURST, supra note 54, at 29.
87 U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
88 See Alan Cowell, France Holds Out a Tentative Olive Branch, With Thorns,
to the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at B10.
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ad bellum principle, or its offering of airspace may be deemed
an illegal "act of aggression" by the Security Council.8 9
At any rate, the fact that some states, such as France, Ger-
many, and Russia voiced their objection to the use of force in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, may be a forceful detraction from the
quantum of acquiescence. 90 But there was no draft resolution
condemning the coalition's use of force against Iraq in the Se-
curity Council, and no state requested a meeting of the General
Assembly to condemn the intervention. Foreign Minister Domi-
nique de Villepin of France said in an address at the Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies in London,
We do not oppose the use of force. We are only warning against
the risks of pre-emptive strikes as a doctrine. What examples are
we setting for other countries? How legitimate would we feel such
an action to be? What are our limits to the use of such might? In
endorsing this doctrine we risk introducing the principle of con-
stant instability and uncertainty.91
This statement seems to be an endorsement of the use of
force in Operation Iraqi Freedom, with the caveat that there
ought to be constraints to prevent the Bush Doctrine from be-
coming a slippery slope.
Another issue on the question of acquiescence by other
states is whether acquiescence by a number of states can be in-
ferred by their silence. "If some states claim that something is
law and other states do not challenge that claim, a new rule will
come into being, even though all the states concerned may real-
ise [sic] that it is a departure from pre-existing rules."92 In
many instances, states do not take active steps, such as a note
of protest, with respect to the actions of another state, either
because it would be ineffective, undiplomatic, or impolite. 93
Other states may have no need to pronounce an opinion in the
89 Davis Brown, Use of Force Against Terrorism After September 11th:State
Responsibility, Self- Defense, and Other Responses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L
1, 22 (2003).
90 See Judy Keen & Dave Moniz, Realities Push Bush Back to U.N., USA To-
DAY, Sept. 4, 2003, at 9A.
91 Alan Cowell, A Nation at War: Overture from Paris; France Holds Out a
Tentative Olive Branch, With Thorns, to the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at
B10.
92 AKEHURST, supra note 54, at 30.
93 See id. at 29.
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matter because it involves a matter that does not affect its own
interests in any significant way.94
The Lotus case is illustrative of the effect of silence by a
state on the content of customary international law.95 The facts
of that case were as follows: a French merchant ship collided
with a Turkish merchant ship on the high seas, allegedly on
account of negligence by an officer on the French ship, Lieuten-
ant Demons.96 Several people on the Turkish ship drowned.9 7
France had jurisdiction to try Lieutenant Demons for man-
slaughter, but the question was whether Turkey also had juris-
diction to try him.98 Turkey argued that a permissive rule of
international law allowed it to try him.99 France argued that,
to the contrary, there was a rule that imposed a constraint on
Turkey's ability to try him.100 The Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice sided with Turkey for the following reasons: (a)
although there were only a few cases in which states in Tur-
key's position had instituted prosecutions, the other states con-
cerned in those cases had not protested against the
prosecutions; and (b) although most states in Turkey's position
had refrained from instituting prosecutions, there was no evi-
dence that they had done so out of a sense of legal obligation. 10 1
The point of this case for the present discussion is this: there
are numerous instances where states refrained from engaging
in acts of preventive war or acts of anticipatory self-defense
along the lines of the Bush Doctrine. However, in order to as-
certain whether these acts of restraint constitute evidence of
customary international law, we would need to know whether
these states restrained themselves out of a sense of legal obliga-
tion, or because of other factors.
Another point concerning customary international law is
the impact of hegemony on custom. The political reality of the
world is that powerful states often establish a hegemonic and
decisive influence in determining the content and application of
94 See id.
95 See id. at 30.
96 See id.
97 See AKEHURST, supra note 54, at 30.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See AKEHURST, supra note 54, at 30.
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custom. 10 2 That is, participation by the major powers in a par-
ticular custom "will be regarded as more significant by the in-
ternational community than would be participation by small
states."10
3
[Tihe share of states in the evolution of international law is not,
and even cannot be, the same.... [Factors such as] power, wealth
and sheer size . . . determine the role played in the evolution of
international customs. It is well known from the history of the
19th century that the great powers of the European Concert exer-
cised in relation to the remaining states of Europe a hegemony
which was not only political. On the initiative of those powers,
and under their authority, legal principles arose which were after-
wards accepted, more or less freely, by the whole of international
society. 10 4
This geopolitical reality suggests that, if custom is based
primarily on actions, then only states with the ability to act can
legitimately acquiesce or reject particular customs. 10 5 This
seems to belie the egalitarian notion within the United Nations
regarding the legal equality of all states as a principle of inter-
national relations. 10 6 But equality among states is something
of a legal fiction; there are extreme variations in de facto power
and influence of states. Even with the participation in the
United Nations of many developing nations,
[piractice being the nucleus of custom, those states are the most
important which have the greatest share and interests [in evolv-
ing practices]-that is, in most cases the great powers. . . . Such
acceptance on the part of the great powers frequently has a deci-
sive effect, because the other states, for this or that reason, pay
more heed to the opinion of those powers than to that of minor
states. 107
Most likely, the only superpower, the United States, is ca-
pable of anticipatory intervention in a situation such as Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom. The United States is one of a handful of
102 See Roberts, supra note 50, at 768.
103 D'AMATO, supra note 22, at 65.
104 KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1993).
105 MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES 37 (1999).
106 See D'Amato, supra note 22, at 65.
107 WOLFKE, supra note 104, at 78-79.
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states that are able to form a custom that will become a legal
principle to be generally accepted by other states.
Furthermore, "[r]ecent state practice may carry proportion-
ately greater weight than past practice in determining the sta-
tus of custom."108  Thus, the fact that the doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense as expressed by the Bush Doctrine is a
"recent" state practice, there may be "greater weight" in restat-
ing the content of customary international law than the "past
practices" related to self-defense as recognized in the U.N.
Charter. 109
III. BACKGROUND OF AUTONOMOUS USE OF FORCE AND U.N.
CHARTER LAW
One of the noble assumptions behind the United Nations'
Charter was that it would protect states from needing to engage
in self-help in connection with international security threats
with collective security protocols. The United Nations' Charter
is guided by the overriding principle in Article 2(4): "All mem-
bers shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations."110 This rule is accepted as
universally applicable, even to the states that are not members
of the United Nations, because it has become part of customary
international law."' This sweeping prohibition is to some ex-
tent balanced by the authorization in Article 39 for the Security
Council "to determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression."'" 2 Following World
War II, the drafters did not find it necessary to define what was
meant by Article '39's terms, "threat to the peace, breach of the
108 Roberts, supra note 50, at 785.
109 Id.
110 U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). The clause, "[o]r in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations," is widely regarded as implying that any
breach of international peace, whether or not it goes against "the territorial integ-
rity or political independence" of a state, contravenes the purposes of the United
Nations Charter (particularly the overriding purpose of Article 1 "to maintain in-
ternational peace and security". See AKEHURST, supra note 54, at 220 (1984) (em-
phasis added).
111 See AKEHURST, supra note 54, at 219.
112 U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
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peace, or act of aggression."1 13 Germany's acts of aggression in
the invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland were egregious
enough that the world community, or at least the victors of
World War II, felt that aggression and breaches of peace were
ascertainable by various military commissions. 114 The Nurem-
berg Tribunal, the Tokyo Major War Crimes Tribunal, and
eventually, the Security Council evaluated breaches of peace
and aggression.11 5
There was a consensus that the level of aggression or
breach of peace which rises to the purview of Article 39 would
be left to a case-by-case interpretation by the Security Coun-
cil. 11 6 Article 42 empowers the Security Council to "make rec-
ommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to
maintain or restore international peace and security."'1 7 Arti-
cle 25 further requires all member nations "to accept and carry
out" those decisions. 118 Article 42 authorizes the Security
Council, if milder measures fail, to "take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security."' 19 To that end, Article 43 calls
upon all members "to make available to the Security Council, on
its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agree-
ments, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights
of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security."' 20 The drafting committee of the
Charter "assumed that states readily would enter into agree-
ments with the Security Council to commit available specified
forces for service when needed."'12 This provision of Article 43,
113 Id.
114 See Major Jan E. Aldykiewicz & Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Authority to Court-
Martial Non-U.S. Military Personnel for Serious Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law Committed During Internal Armed Conflicts, 167 MIL. L. REV. 74,
76 (2001).
115 See Major Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction
Over Foreign Nationals Who Commit International Crimes, MIL. L. REV. 1, 45-46
(1996).
116 See Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), to the Secre-
tary of State (Sept. 1, 1944), in 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 1944, 761, 762 (1966).
117 U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
118 Id. art. 25.
119 U.N. CHARTER, art. 42.
120 Id. art. 43, para. 1.
121 Franck, supra note 28, at 52.
2003]
23
PACE INT'L L. REV. [Vol. 15:283
however chivalrous in purpose, has never been implemented. 122
That is, member states have never entered into the arrange-
ments necessary to give the Security Council an effective stand-
by collective armed force. 123 Instead, in the cases where the Se-
curity Council has voted to declare Article 39 breaches of
peace, 124 the Council has called upon national contingents in
what has come to be called a "coalition of the willing. ' 125
The efficacy of the Security Council in fulfilling the security
needs of states is also thwarted by procedural deficiencies and
constraints. 126 The Security Council, comprising of only fifteen
states, with each of the five permanent members having the
power of veto, it cannot be expected to make speedy and objec-
tive decisions as to when collective security measures are
necessary. 127
122 See id. at 53.
123 See id. at 54.
124 The Security Council has had occasion to call for ad hoc collective forces,
despite the absence of Article 43 forces of its own, on several occasions: The Ko-
rean War in 1950, Operation Desert Storm after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
the expanded peace and security mandate regarding Somalia in 1992, the calling
for a multinational force to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military lead-
ership that had overthrown the democratically elected government, and the ad hoc
"coalition of the willing" together with NATO's air and naval command mandated
in the former Yugoslavia and for the defense of Bosnian "safe areas" in 1992. See
Franck, supra note 28, at 54-56.
125 Franck, supra note 28, at 54.
126 See Shashi Tharoor, If The U.N. Were Being Created Today, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2003, at B9.
127 It has been pointed out that the U.N. Charter is extremely difficult to
amend. Amendments require a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General
Assembly, plus ratification by the legislatures of two-thirds of the members (which
would mean 128 parliaments today), including all five of the permanent members
of the Security Council. See Shashi Tharoor, If the U.N. Were Being Created To-
day, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2003, at A17. The Charter also contains obsolete refer-
ences to "enemy states," which pertain to the Axis powers of Japan and Germany
that were defeated in World War II; bygone institutions such as the Trusteeship
Council, which continues as one of the United Nations' "principal organs," even
though there are practically no trust territories left after persistent decolonization;
unimplemented provisions such as the articles in Chapter VII calling upon mem-
ber states to conclude agreements with the United Nations to provide land, sea
and air forces on call to enforce the peace; and bodies that never performed their
intended mission, such as the military staff committee created in Article 47 to pro-
vide "strategic direction" to the Security Council's nonexistent armed forces. See
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IV. NOTION OF SELF-DEFENSE BASED ON IMPLIED
AUTHORIZATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
It is noteworthy that the United States did seek to justify
Operation Iraqi Freedom based on "implied authorization" from
extant U.N. Security Council Resolutions. This tactic has been
advanced in the past in connection with enforcement of the "no-
fly" zones and other skirmishes with Iraqi forces, but has been
met with skepticism, to say the least. 128 The Security Council
128 Christine Gray, From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use
of Force Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (2002). A separate legal justifica-
tion for the patrolling of no-fly zones was to prevent a grave humanitarian crisis.
See id. at 9. Much criticism has been directed by Security Council members, claim-
ing that these actions in the no-fly zone are illegitimate despite claims of humani-
tarian justification. See id. at 10.
"Implied authorization" of the Security Council was also advanced to justify
President Clinton's air strikes against Iraq for the attempted assassination of
George H.W. Bush in 1993, and his strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan follow-
ing the Embassy Bombings in Tarzania and Kenya in 1998, which has caused a
certain degree of polarization among states. See Gray, supra, at 8-15. For in-
stance, NATO member states claimed an implied Security Council authorization
for their use of force in Kosovo, even in the absence of any express authority in a
resolution. See id. And the Security Council defeated resoundingly a vote of cen-
sure of NATO's intervention in Kosovo. See U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at
6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989 (1999). The U.S.A., the UK and France justified actions in
the ongoing clashes with Iraq over the no-fly zones and to protect the Kurds in
northern Iraq in April 1991 based on implied authorization pursuant to Resolution
688, which demanded that Iraq end the repression of its civilian population and
allow access to international humanitarian organizations but in itself did not au-
thorize the use of force. See Christine Gray, supra, at 9. Allied forces claimed the
use of force was "consistent with," "supportive of," "in implementation of' and "pur-
suant to" Resolution 688. See id.
The doctrine of implied Security Council authorization was also invoked in
actions against Iraq for non-cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors under Reso-
lution 687 ceasefire regime. In December 1998, in order to retaliate against Iraq,
the U.S. and UK forces launched a major operation lasting four days, involving
more missiles than used in the entire 1991 conflict. See id. at 11. The basis for
implied Security Council authorization was Security Council Resolutions 1154 and
1205 even though they had not made express provision for the use of force. Resolu-
tion 1154 said that Iraq must, under Resolution 687, accord immediate and un-
restricted access to UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors and that any violation would
have "the severest consequences for Iraq." See id. Resolution 1205 condemned the
decision of Iraq to stop cooperation with UNSCOM and demanded that Iraq re-
scind its decision. See id. at 12. The UK argued that Resolution 1205 had im-
pliedly revived the authority to use force given in Resolution 678 (the cease-fire
resolution of 1990), which provided that Member States could employ all necessary
means to secure compliance with the Council's resolutions and restore interna-
tional peace and security in the area. That is, the argument was that Resolution
687 made it a condition of Resolution 678, the cease fire resolution, that Iraq de-
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imposed sanctions against Iraq following the Gulf War of 1990-
91, implementing a Ceasefire Resolution (Resolution 678).129
That Resolution was supplemented by Resolution 687, which re-
quired Iraq to cooperate with weapons inspections mandated
under Resolution 678.130 Commenting on a January 1993 strike
against an Iraqi missile site in the no-fly zones, the U.N. Secre-
tary-General seemed to endorse the notion of implied authoriza-
tion by saying that the strike by allied forces was justified
because Iraq was is in material breach of the ceasefire resolu-
tion because it failed to cooperate with the weapons inspections
required under Resolution 687.131 However, the Secretary-Gen-
eral has not subsequently revived this justification for subse-
quent coalition attacks in the no-fly zones. 132 Moreover, critics
claim that individual states do not have the right to declare Iraq
in material breach of the Ceasefire Resolution, a power that
properly lies with the Security Council alone. 133
It is for the Security Council to determine not only the existence
of a breach of the ceasefire, but also the consequences of such a
breach in cases where there is a binding ceasefire imposed by the
Security Council. Moreover, it seems doubtful whether any
breach of Resolution 687 [providing for cooperation with weapons
inspectors] not itself involving the use of force can justify the USA
and UK in turning to force in response. Those who support this
doctrine of material breach seem impatient of disagreement in the
Security Council; they revive Cold War arguments that when the
Security Council is unable to act because of a permanent member
then the USA and the UK can go ahead to use force, if there has
been a breach of a prior resolution passed under Chapter VII,
even in the absence of express authorization. But this has dan-
gers for the Security Council's right to consider further action; it
also discounts statements in debates that it is for the Security
stroy its weapons of mass destruction and agree to a monitoring of its obligations
to destroy such weapons. By flagrantly failing to cooperate with weapons inspec-
tors, Iraq had violated Resolution 687, impliedly reviving the authority to use force
stated in Resolution 678. However, in the Security Council debates following the
operation only Japan endorsed this interpretation. See id. Russia outright
claimed that the resolutions provided no grounds whatsoever for such action. See
id.
129 See Gray, supra note 128, at 2.
130 See id. at 6-7.
131 See id. at 7.
132 See id.
133 See id.
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Council to take further action. This undermines the authority of
the Security Council and ignores the careful negotiations between
states attempting to reach agreement on controversial issues.1
3 4
In fall 2002, the Security Council unanimously passed Se-
curity Council Resolution 1441, which required Iraq to report
and account for its weapons of mass destruction, and warning of
"serious consequences" for non-compliance. 135 Clearly, Resolu-
tion 1441 does not authorize the use of force to effect Iraq's com-
pliance. The Security Council was unable to come to a
consensus over whether Iraq had committed a "material
breach" of Resolution 1441 after numerous reports of weapons
inspectors, allegations, denials, and arguments to allow further
time for inspectors to carry out their work.136 Resolution 1441,
however, contains no provisions for the use of force; that would
have to be addressed by a subsequent Resolution declaring Iraq
in material breach of 1441. It would have been impolitic and
unwise for coalition forces to pin their justification of Operation
Iraqi Freedom on an implied authorization of the use of force
from Resolution 1441. The strongest case, made in connection
with Iraq's breach of the Ceasefire Resolution, was its failure to
cooperate with the weapons inspections required under Resolu-
tion 687. Ironically, this logic failed to garner Security Council
support. Then again, it appears that the legal justification prof-
fered by the United Kingdom was predicated on implied author-
ization from Security Council resolutions. 137
134 See Gray, supra note 128, at 7.
135 U.N. SC Res. 1441, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1441
(2002); Roy Eccleston, Madman Saddam Had To Go: Bush-Iraq: Counting The
Cost, THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN (Washington), Oct. 11, 2003, at 17.
136 Foreign Affairs Minister S. Jayakumar, Remarks at the Annual U.N. Meet-
ing (Oct. 1, 2003), in THE SINGAPORE TIMES, Oct. 2003.
137 According to the Attorney General of the United Kingdom, in an answer to
a Parliamentary question, the legal basis for the use of force in Iraq is as follows:
Authority to use force against Iraq exists from the combined effect of reso-
lutions 678, 687 and 1441. All of these resolutions were adopted under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allows the use of force for the ex-
press purpose of restoring international peace and security:
1. In Resolution 678 the Security Council authorised force against Iraq, to
eject it from Kuwait and to restore peace and security in the area.
2. In Resolution 687, which set out the ceasefire conditions after Opera-
tion Desert Storm, the Security Council imposed continuing obligations on
Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction in order to restore inter-
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Similarly, Ruth Wedgwood argues that Security Council
Resolution 687, the cease-fire that formally ended the Gulf War,
was expressly linked to Iraq's "unconditional [] accept [ance]" of
two conditions: to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and to
allow verification by weapons inspectors. 138 In 1997-98, Iraq de-
fied these cease-fire terms, therefore Wedgwood argues that
this defiance allowed the United States to deem the cease-fire in
suspension and engage in military operations to enforce its con-
ditions. 139 Iraq's defiance consisted of: shutting down inspec-
tions, making claims that the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM, established by Security Council Resolution 687 to
monitor compliance) was an American espionage agency, and
that weapons inspection teams had a disproportionate number
of Americans and British.140 Iraq also threatened the safety of
the Special Commission's high-altitude surveillance plane, and
challenged its right to examine sixty-eight "presidential and
national peace and security in the area. Resolution 687 suspended but did
not terminate the authority to use force under resolution 678.
3. A material breach of Resolution 687 revives the authority to use force
under Resolution 678.
4. In Resolution 1441 the Security Council determined that Iraq has been
and remains in material breach of resolution 687, because it has not fully
complied with its obligations to disarm under that resolution.
5. The Security Council in Resolution 1441 gave Iraq "a final opportunity
to comply with its disarmament obligations" and warned Iraq of the 'seri-
ous consequences' if it did not.
6. The Security Council also decided in resolution 1441 that, if Iraq failed
at any time to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of
resolution 1441, that would constitute a further material breach.
7. It is plain that Iraq has failed so to comply and therefore Iraq was at
the time of resolution 1441 and continues to be in material breach.
8. Thus, the authority to use force under resolution 678 has revived and
so continues today.
9. Resolution 1441 would in terms have provided that a further decision
of the Security Council to sanction force was required if that had been
intended. Thus, all that resolution 1441 requires is reporting to and dis-
cussion by the Security Council of Iraq's failures, but not an express fur-
ther decision to authorise force.
Legal basis for use of force against Iraq -statement by Attorney General, BRIT. INST.
INT'L & COMP. L, 65-66, Issue No. 6, Bulletin of Legal Developments (2003).
138 Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The
Threat of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 724,
726 (1998); U.N. SCOR, Res. 687, (Apr. 3,1991), 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991).
139 See id. at 726.
140 See id. at 725.
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sovereign sites."141 These facts were exacerbated by reports by
UNSCOM to the Security Council that, while some progress
had been made in dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons program,
there was an ongoing concern about Iraq's biological and chemi-
cal weapons programs, including the production of deadly VX
nerve gas. 142 Iraq's biological and chemical weapons program
had been concealed until mid-1995, when UNSCOM uncovered
Iraq's importation of thirty-nine tons of biological "growth me-
dia."1 43 Iraq, for its part, claimed that its biological and chemi-
cal weapons program had terminated in 1991, but refused to
provide UNSCOM with any documentation of the destruction of
virulent agents such as anthrax, botulinum and aflatoxin. 144 In
addition, seventeen tons of growth media were unaccounted for,
as well as six hundred tons of VX precursor. 145
The United States began a significant build-up of air and
sea forces in the Persian Gulf and announced its willingness to
use military force in the event Iraq continued to flout the U.N.
inspection regime. In February 1998, Secretary-General Kofi
Annan met with officials in Baghdad and obtained a renewed
promise by Iraq to permit weapons inspections to proceed. 146
Wedgwood makes the point that the United States was en-
titled to threaten the use of military force to gain Iraqi compli-
ance because of the conditional nature of the 1991 ceasefire,
coupled with the prior practice under the UNSCOM regime, in
which military force was deployed in 1993 to deter Iraqi inter-
ference with inspections. 147 She argues that Iraq's defiance of
the cease-fire terms of resolution 678 allowed the United States
to deem the cease-fire in suspension and to resume military op-
erations to enforce its conditions.148 She also counters the argu-
ment that the United States lacks "standing" to enforce
breaches of the cease-fire resolution because the ad hoc coalition
141 Id. at 725.
142 Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9(b)(i) of Resolution
687, U.N. Doc. S/1997/774 (1991).
143 Wedgwood, supra note 138, at 725.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See The Deal on Iraq: How Accord Will Work: Special Group Is Set Up, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998, at A10.
147 See Wedgwood, supra note 138, at 725.
148 See id. at 726.
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of the willing, led by the United States, had been "authorize[d]"
to "use all necessary means" to remove Iraq from Kuwait and,
as well, to "restore international peace and security in the
area."149 She says,
It is not unreasonable to regard the terms of such a cease-fire as
self-executing, just as the violation of a newly settled boundary
line or demilitarized zone would entitle a neighboring state to act
upon a violation. Iraq could hardly cloak itself in the cease-fire's
benefits while flagrantly violating one of its principal
conditions. 150
Moreover, an earlier crisis erupted in January 1993 when
Iraq notified UNSCOM that it could no longer use the Hab-
baniyah airfield, and thereby prevented short-notice inspec-
tions. 151 The President of the Security Council stated that the
action was an "unacceptable and material breach of the rele-
vant provisions of Resolution 687 (1991), which established the
cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the restora-
tion of peace and security in the region."152 He further stated
that Iraq was warned that "serious consequences" would flow
from its "continued defiance." 53 On January 13, 1993, the
United States, joined by the United Kingdom and France, con-
ducted air raids on sites in Iraq without any Council vote for a
new resolution authorizing the use of force.' 54 As Professor
Wedgwood points out, "The claim that a new Council resolution
was a prerequisite to the threat or use of force in the 1997-1998
confrontation is difficult to square with the precedent of Janu-
149 U.N. SCOR, Res. 678, para. 2 (Nov. 29, 1990), 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990) (Secur-
ity Council "[a] uthorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Ku-
wait.., to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990)
[demanding withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.").
150 Wedgwood, supra note 138, at 725-26. Prof. Wedgwood also points out that
The Security Council itself found Iraq to be in "flagrant violation" of its obligations,
and the Council's President warned that "serious consequences" would result in
Iraq's refusal to allow inspections, and cited the regime's "clear violation of rele-
vant resolutions." See id.
151 See id. at 725.
152 Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning United Na-
tions flights into Iraqi territory, UN Doc. S/25081 (1993).
153 Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, UN Doc. S/25091
(1993).
154 See Wedgwood, supra note 138, at 727.
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ary 1993." 15 5 After Iraq had agreed to continued compliance
with the inspection regime following the 1997-1998 crisis, Secre-
tary-General Kofi Annan was asked on a news program
whether any future use of military force would require a new
Security Council resolution. 156 He said, "If the U.S. had to
strike, I think some sort of consultations with other members
would be required."157 But he did not deny that any future uni-
lateral strike by the United States to respond to further in-
stances of Iraqi non-compliance would be impliedly authorized
by extant Security Council resolutions. 158
Notwithstanding the compelling legal arguments in favor of
reliance on implied authorization of Security Council resolu-
tions, the United States sought to justify the use of force in Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom based solely on the doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense, or preventive war, with the purpose of
disarming the regime of weapons of mass destruction, and erad-
icating terrorist cells that are sponsored or tolerated by the
state. 159 A secondary justification appears to be humanitarian
intervention with the purpose of liberating the Iraqi people
from a brutal dictator, who, as mentioned above, has been re-
sponsible for genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war
155 Id. at 728.
156 See This Week: Remarks of Secretary-General Kofi Annan (ABC television
broadcast, Mar. 8,1998).
157 Id.
158 See generally id.
159 Although the President did not hinge the justification for Operation Iraqi
Freedom on Congressional authorization, such authorization could plausibly be
pegged on the Joint Resolution of Congress, Pub. L. 107-40 § 2(a) (Sept. 18, 2001),
stating:
[Tlhe President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.
(Emphasis added). Under this Resolution one might argue that the attack on Iraq
was impliedly authorized by the Joint Resolution of Congress "in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism" by Iraq, based on its being a nation that
the President has determined harbored terrorist organizations or persons, even
though Iraq might not have been implicated in the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.
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crimes, particularly for its use of chemical weapons in the war
with Iran. 160
Understandably, the United States and Britain lost pa-
tience with the Security Council's efforts to prolong weapons in-
spections. 161 The fact that Iraq possessed various weapons of
mass destruction in the past concerned these two nations. 16 2 If
the evidence of weapons of mass destruction appears un-
founded, there are two possibilities: these weapons are still in
Iraq, albeit concealed, or they were destroyed, leaving only ad-
ministrative documents that account for their disposition as
evidence.
V. SELF-DEFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER
AND THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE UNDER
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.' 6 3
The right of self-defense, as envisioned by the drafters, was
textually limited to the then-existing concept of "armed at-
tack."1 64 Moreover, the drafters contemplated that states sub-
160 See Christopher C. Joyner and Anthony Clark Arend, Anticipatory Human-
itarian Intervention: An Emerging Legal Norm?, 10 U.S.A.F.A. J. LEGAL STUD. 27,
40-43 (1999/2000).
161 See Julian Coman, The blunt response of Britain's UN Ambassador to a call
from the PM signalled just how bad things had got at the Security Council, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 16, 2003, at 2.
162 See id.
163 U.N. CHARTER, art. 51 (Emphasis added).
164 Franck, supra note 28, at 57. During the drafting of the United Nations
Charter, Governor Harold Stassen, deputy head of delegation at San Francisco,
insisted that a greatly limited right of self-defense "was intentional and sound. We
did not want exercised the right of self-defense before an armed attack had oc-
curred." Minutes of the Forty-Eighth Meeting (Executive Session) of the United
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ject to attack would defend themselves until such time that the
U.N. would deploy Article 43 forces to combat the aggression. 165
But as noted above, Article 43 security forces have never been
established.
There is an apparent contradiction in Article 51. On one
hand, the article states, "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fense," while this "inherent right" is immediately qualified in
the same sentence by the words, "if an armed attack occurs
... 166 This may suggest that Members forfeited whatever in-
herent rights of self-defense that may exist under customary in-
ternational law. Numerous commentators have pointed out
that customary international law pertaining to the inherent
right of self-defense contains no "armed attack" constraint. 167
This inconsistency suggests that Members of the United Na-
tions have less right to defend themselves than do non-mem-
bers. However, it is generally agreed that Article 51 does not
supersede or abrogate notions of self-defense under customary
international law.' 68 D. W. Bowett spoke to this point:
It is, therefore, fallacious to assume that members have only
those rights which the Charter accords to them; on the contrary
they have those rights which general international law accords to
them except and in so far as they have surrendered them under
the Charter.... As we have seen, the view of Committee I at San
Francisco was that this prohibition left the right of self-defence
unimpaired; in the words of the rapporteur 'the use of arms in
States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Sunday, May 20, 1945, 12 Noon, in 1
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1945, 813, 818 (1967). When another
member of the delegation, Mr. Gates, "posed a question as to our freedom under
this provision in case a fleet had started from abroad against an American repub-
lic, but had not yet attacked," Governor Stassen said that "we could not under this
provision attack the fleet but we could send a fleet of our own and be ready in case
an attack came." Id. at 707, 709.
165 See Franck, supra note 28, at 57
166 U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
167 Abraham D. Sofaer, U.S. Acted Legally in Foreign Raids, NEWSDAY (New
York), Oct. 19, 1998, at A29. Sofaer, a former State Department Legal Advisor,
opined: "Self-defense allows a proportionate response to every use of force, not just
'armed attacks."' Id; see also D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
188 (1958) (noting that, with respect to customary international law before the
U.N. Charter was enacted: "[1It is quite certain that under the general law the
right was not limited to cases of armed attack."). Id.
168 See BOWETT, supra note 167, at 188.
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legitimate self-defence remains admitted and unimpaired.'... The
history of Art. 51 suggests nothing of an additional obligation; the
travaux preparatoires, to which we may legitimately resort in the
case of ambiguity, suggest only that the articles should safeguard
the right of self-defence, not restrict it.169
Moreover, one of the drafters of the treaty for the Renuncia-
tion of War (the Briand-Kellogg Pact or "Pact of Paris"), signed
in Paris on August 27, 1928, said:
That right [of self-defense] is inherent in every sovereign state
and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times
and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from at-
tack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether cir-
cumstances require recourse to war in self-defense. If it has a
good case, the world will applaud and not condemn its action.' 70
The "inherent right" of self-defense in Article 51 refers to
the broad right of self-defense that existed under customary in-
ternational law before the U.N. Charter was established, and
which presumably evolves as customary international
evolves. 171 Because of modern developments in warfare, inter-
national legal scholars interpret Article 51 more expansively
than a literal reading of its text might allow. Consequently, a
state need not wait until the actual occurrence of an armed at-
tack prior to asserting an Article 51 right to defend itself.172
For example, scholars have opined that the mere presence of
state sponsorship and support of international terrorists could
constitute the use or threat of force prohibited by Article 2(4),
which would justify self-defense either under a reasonable con-
struction of "armed attack" or under the more elastic interna-
tional norm that allows for anticipatory self-defense. 73
This view conflicts with the term "armed attack" as defined
by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United
169 Id.
170 TREATY FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR 57 (Dept. of State Publication 468
(1933)) (emphasis added).
171 U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
172 See generally Louis HENKIN, ET AL, RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE 40-47 (1991).
173 RICHARD ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-
SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 109, 113 (1989).
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States of America.174 Nicaragua addressed whether Nicara-
gua's provision of weapons and other support to rebels seeking
to overthrow the Salvadorian government constituted an
"armed attack."175 The Court said: "[W]hile the concept of an
armed attack includes the despatch by one State of armed
bands into the territory of another State, the supply of arms
and other support to such bands cannot be equated with an
armed attack."176 The Court concluded that an armed attack
does not exist merely in virtue of "assistance to rebels in the
form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other sup-
port."1 77 Only active support such as an actual "sending" of
"armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries," or "substan-
tial involvement therein" would constitute an "armed attack"
under Article 51.178 Under this view, it is not entirely clear
whether any attack in response to a terrorist attack (including
the United States' and allied use of force in Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan following the September 11th terrorist
attacks) would be lawful. Moreover, any strict construction of
Article 51 would make promoting military action against Iraq
difficult in the absence of an overt military offensive against the
United States or its allies.
Under the Court's formulation, the use of force against the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan following the September 11 terror-
ist attacks was unlawful. For that matter, if the government of
Afghanistan had directly provided the terrorists with airplane
174 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27). Decisions of the Court are not binding, according to Article 59 of the
Statute of the I.C.J. 1945 I.C.J. STAT., art. 59. However, judicial decisions in gen-
eral represent "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law" under Arti-
cle 38 thereof. 1945 I.C.J. STAT., art. 38. All member states of the United Nations
are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See U.N.
CHARTER, art. 93, para. 1.
175 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 119.
176 Id. at 126-27.
177 Id. at 103-04.
178 Id. The position of the International Court of Justice was already taken to
be the case by other commentators. For example, in 1963, Ian Brownlie stated:
Since the phrase "armed attack" strongly suggests a trespass it is very
doubtful if it applies to the case of aid to revolutionary groups and forms
of annoyance which do not involve offensive operations by the forces of a
state. Sporadic operations by armed bands would also seem to fall outside
the concept of "armed attack."
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE By STATES 278 (1963).
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tickets, funds for flight lessons, and the box cutters used to hijack
the aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, or if the Afghan government had provided the anthrax
spores used to contaminate the American postal system, such sup-
port still would not constitute an armed attack, and the use of
force against the Afghan government would therefore not have
been permitted. Indeed, the entire approach of the United States
in fighting terrorism-refusing to distinguish between terrorists
and those who harbor them, which has come to be called the
"Bush Doctrine"-is outlawed by this precept to the extent that it
precludes any use of force against states that only passively pro-
vide a safe harbor for terrorists and avoid substantial involve-
ment in the terrorists' activities. 179
Nicaragua did not explicitly address the issue of anticipa-
tory self-defense, with the Court stating that since "the issue of
the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed
attack has not been raised ... the Court expresses no view on
that issue."18 0 The Court also noted, in strictly construing
"armed attack," that whether states might establish an excep-
tion to the general principle of non-intervention will depend in
part on whether they "justified their conduct by reference to a
new right of intervention or a new exception to the principle of
its prohibition.' 18 1 "Reliance by a State on a novel right or an
unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in
principle by other States, tend towards a modification of cus-
tomary international law."'182 In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Schwebel expressed support for the view that under Article 51,
self-defense was not limited to a situation "if, and only if, an
armed attack occurs.' 83
Nicaragua may be criticized because the Court interpreted
"inherent" to mean a right that is based in customary interna-
tional law that remained extant after the U.N. Charter was
adopted while it failed to consider the actual practices of states
in order to ascertain whether a more expansive right of self-de-
fense under customary international law in fact exists in addi-
tion to the more inelastic version of self-defense stated in
179 Glennon, supra note 34, at 543-44.
180 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 103.
181 Id. at 109.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 358 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel).
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Article 51.184 The Court simply failed to consider the underly-
ing geopolitical realities, and hence did a disservice to the juris-
prudence of international law. The fact is that
[s]o many states have used force with such regularity in so wide a
variety of situations that it can no longer said that any customary
norm of state practice constrains the use of force. Had the Court
approached the issue with a modicum of intellectual honesty, it
would have rested its opinion on other doctrines of customary in-
ternational law that counseled abstention in dealing with the gap
in the law that the Court strove so mightily to ignore.
8 5
A restrictionist view of Article 51 holds that anticipatory
self-defense is unlawful under Article 51.186 This ignores the
reality that terrorist organizations have global reach, some-
thing that was unknown when Article 51 was drafted.18 7 It is
impossible to predict when a rogue state that sponsors terror-
ism and develops weapons of mass destruction will actually
strike. In certain situations the use of force against safe-harbor
states may be the only means available to eliminate the threat
of terrorist strikes. Since the ability of terrorists to inflict harm
depends on the indifference or active sponsorship of a host gov-
ernment that could curtail that ability simply by withdrawing
its hospitality, it belies common sense to say it is unlawful for
the aggrieved state to take preventive actions. In addition, to-
day there are more ominous types of "attack" that are not so
much "armed" as they are covert, surrogate strands of warfare,
and military aggression waged indirectly, subversively, or by
covert foreign intervention.'l 8  While the notion of "armed at-
tack" in 1945 must have taken into consideration the availabil-
ity of atomic bombs and the German-made V-1 and V-2
supersonic ballistic missiles, the drafters of the U.N. Charter
184 See id.
185 Glennon, supra note 34, at 554-55.
186 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 178, at 278 ("[Tjhe view that Article 51 does
not permit anticipatory self-defense is correct and ... arguments to the contrary
are either unconvincing or based on inconclusive pieces of evidence."); see also,
PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1952) ("Under the Charter,
alarming military preparations by a neighbouring state would justify a resort to
the Security Council, but would not justify resort to anticipatory force by the state
which believed itself threatened.").
187 See BROWNLIE, supra note 178, at 278.
188 Franck, supra note 28, at 57.
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"did not fully anticipate the existence, tenacity and technology
of modern day terrorism."'18 9
Also, concepts of self-defense that may have prevailed in
1945 may not be commensurate with the globalization of trade,
the changing subject matter of international law, and the di-
minished importance of state boundaries.190 Furthermore,
"modern methods of intelligence collection, such as satellite im-
agery and communication intercepts, now make it unnecessary
to sit out an actual armed attack to await convincing proof of a
state's hostile intent."' 91 "[T]he advent of weapons of mass de-
struction and their availability to international terrorists, the
first blow can be devastating - far more devastating than the
pinprick attacks on which the old rules [i.e., Article 51] were
premised."192 Finally, "the danger of catalytic war erupting
from the use of preemptive force has lessened with the end of
the Cold War. It made sense to hew to Article 51 during the
Cuban Missile Crisis .... It makes less sense today, when safe-
haven states and terrorist organizations are not themselves
possessed of preemptive capabilities." 93 The doctrine of self-
defense should not be construed by looking to the past, but
rather to the present. In light of our current reality, it seems
preposterous to suggest that a state should idly stand by until
the actual physical manifestations of an armed attack occur. It
would mean that the planning, organization, and logistical
preparation of an attack by military planners of an enemy state
would not yet justify military intervention.194
189 Beck & Arend, supra note 160, at 214.
190 See Roberts, supra note 50, at 777. International law now views the intra-
state actions of states (not just interstate interactions), to be an important concern,
particularly with regards to human rights obligations that apply to a government's
treatment of its own citizens. See id.
191 Michael Glennon, Preempting Terrorism; the Case for Anticipatory Self-De-
fense, WKLv. STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2002, at 25.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 1 think it is well worth noting that in municipal law, the Government need
not await the actual commission of criminal acts before apprehending criminals.
Conspiracy to commit crimes, that is, while the assailants are in the planning
stages of executing a plot, is a staple of the common law. A conspiracy is an agree-
ment by two or more persons to commit an unlawful act. See W. LAFAVE & A.
SCo', CRIMINAL LAW 453 (1972). The crime of conspiracy is completed, and may
be prosecuted, before any overt action occurs beyond the formation of the agree-
ment. See Thomas Church, Jr., Conspiracy Doctrine and Speech Offenses: A Re-
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The United States did not press a case for anticipatory self-
defense in Operation Enduring Freedom because an armed, ter-
rorist attack had already occurred on September 11, albeit not
by another state, but by terrorists who were deemed by compel-
ling evidence to have been actively sponsored by the Taliban
regime. 195 The use of force in Operation Iraqi Freedom, how-
ever, has been advanced as a permissible case of anticipatory
self-defense. Today, it is unrealistic to expect a state to forestall
protecting its national security by waiting until there has been
an armed attack or an act of chemical, biological, or nuclear ter-
rorism. The long-held strategy of containing enemies appears
to be insufficient to eradicate the threat of rogue states. As
President Bush said on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom, "In
the 20th century, some chose to appease murderous dictators
whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global
war. In this century, when evil men plot chemical, biological
examination of Yates v. United States from the Perspective of United States v.
Spoke, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 569, 572 (Apr. 1975). An "overt act" refers to any legal
or illegal act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Conspiracy as a crime is thought to
justify prosecution prior to an overt act because the joint illegal intent of two or
more individuals is significantly more dangerous than a similar intent on the part
of an individual. Id.; see also LAFAvE & Scorr, supra, at 459-60.
When two agree to carry [a plot] into effect, the very plot is an act in
itself... The agreement is an advancement of the intention which each
has conceived in his mind; the mind proceeds from a secret intention to
the overt act of mutual consultation and agreement.
State v. Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 336-37 (1952).
In the famous Supreme Court case, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951) (upholding conviction for advocating overthrow of the government before
any overt acts were undertaken in furtherance of goal), the Supreme Court articu-
lated the "clear and present danger" test in an effort to determine when in time the
authorities may step in and stop imminent lawless action from taking place. How
"imminent" must the lawless action be? How overt must the acts of the conspira-
tors be? The "clear and present danger test" is satisfied without any overt act in
furtherance of a conspiracy based on the notion that preventing the spread of dan-
gerous speech may be essential to national security:
Obviously, ["clear and present danger"] cannot mean that before the Gov-
ernment may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed,
the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If Government is
aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate
its members and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike
when the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Govern-
ment is required.
Id. at 509.
195 See Michael J. Glennon, supra note 34, at 548.
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and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruc-
tion of a kind never before seen on this earth."196
VI. PRECEDENTS AND REACTIONS IN THE U.N. TO
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
Instances of anticipatory self-defense have elicited varying
responses in the past from the international community and the
United Nations, with some cases having been tacitly allowed by
the U.N. 197 For example, when Israel conducted a "preventive"
attack on Egypt in 1956, the U.N. did not criticize the action, but
in fact authorized the stationing of U.N. peacekeepers in the
Sinai region. 198 The U.N. "apportioned no blame for the out-
break of fighting and specifically refused to condemn the exer-
cise of self-defense by Israel."'199
When the United States imposed a naval quarantine on
Cuba to compel the removal of Soviet missiles that were per-
ceived to pose a threat to American security, the doctrine of an-
ticipatory-self defense prevailed. 200 The Cuban Missile Crisis
occurred in October 1962, and, as is widely known, information
disclosed by President John F. Kennedy indicated that the Sovi-
ets were assembling delivery systems for intermediate range
ballistic missiles in Cuba.20' Regarding this development as "a
deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status
quo,"202 Kennedy ordered a naval blockade, which he termed a
"quarantine," to prevent the transport of missiles and related
materiel to Cuba.20 3 Under an accepted norm of international
law, a blockade, whether termed quarantine or not, constitutes
a violation of Article 2(4).204 As such, it could only be consid-
ered permissible if it could be demonstrated that it fell into an
196 Carla Anne Robbins, Ceasing Diplomacy, U.S. Nears War, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 18, 2003, at Al.
197 See Franck, supra note 28, at 59.
198 Id.
199 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 429 (1977).
200 See Franck, supra note 28, at 59.
201 See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE 74 (1993).
202 Address by President Kennedy, reprinted in ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN
DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 153 (1968).
203 Id.
204 See id.
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exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition. 20 5 At the time, the
question of anticipatory self-defense was widely discussed in le-
gal scholarship. 20 6 During the course of debates on the matter
in the U.N. Security Council, members differed as to whether
the missiles in question were defensive or offensive, but no one
rejected the concept of anticipatory self-defense. 20 7 There
seemed to be a consensus that in certain situations the preemp-
tive use of force could be justified.208
When a U.S. aircraft attacked bases in Libya in 1986, alleg-
edly used for terrorist attacks on its citizens abroad, the doc-
trine of self-defense under Article 51 was invoked, and a
resolution condemning the U.S. action was introduced in the Se-
curity Council, but was vetoed by the United States, France,
and the United Kingdom. 20 9 However, the U.N. General As-
sembly adopted a resolution condemning the attack of the
United States by a vote of seventy-nine to twenty-eight, with
thirty-three abstentions. 210 There was widespread criticism of
the Libya raid, in part due to Cold War politics. In addition,
critics based legitimate concern over the following: what evi-
dence existed to link the West Berlin discotheque bombing to
terrorist activities in Libya, what legal basis existed for an
armed response against a state for the actions of terrorists
under Article 51, how could an "armed attack" exist in the iso-
lated murder of American servicemen abroad, and related argu-
ments that U.S. actions were retaliatory in nature, unnecessary
and disproportionate. 211 Often enough, international criticism
205 See id.
206 See, e.g., Christol & Davis, Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of
Offensive Weapons and Associated Materiel to Cuba, 1962, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 525
(1963); Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963);
Myres S. McDougall, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 597 (1963).
207 See Wright, supra note 207, at 602.
208 See AREND & BECK, supra note 201, at 75.
209 See U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2682d mtg. at 43, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2682 (1986).
Australia and Denmark also voted against the resolution, and Venezuela ab-
stained. Id.
210 G.A. Res. 41/38, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 34, U.N. Doc. A/
41/53 (1986).
211 O'Brien, infra note 275, at 464-65. Members of the U.N. Security Council
criticized the U.S. raid on Libya for, among other things, not being in response to
an "armed attack," and not being based on substantiated Libyan involvement in
terrorist activities. See id. The raid was also criticized as being in the nature of
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of particular moves, as occurred in the wake of the United
States attack on Libya in 1986, changes over the course of time.
In the Libya incident, "as in others, an elongation of the time
horizon yields a different picture of international responses. Af-
ter the immediate reaction to the raid and the regional and na-
tional condemnations, Western European nations began to
adopt economic and diplomatic sanctions against Libya."212
In 1993, when the United States launched a cruise missile
attack on Iraq's Intelligence Service in Baghdad, in response to
a failed assassination attempt against former President Bush,
causing a number of civilian deaths and destroying much of the
complex, again justifying the move under Article 51, most states
either supported the move or did not object to it, although most
of the Arab world expressed regret regarding the attack.213
Only China questioned the attack.214 The General Assembly
took no action.
In 1998, when the United States launched retaliatory
cruise missile strikes against Osama bin-Laden's training
camps in Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant
that the United States had identified as a "chemical weapons
facility," following terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in
Tanzania and Kenya, it justified this move as an Article 51 ex-
ercise of self-defense in response to an armed attack.215 World
reaction was mixed, with the most intense criticism directed on
reprisal rather than straightforward self-defense. See also Francis A. Boyle, Mili-
tary Responses to Terrorism, 81 PROC. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 288, 294 (1987) ("The
April 14 devastation wreaked upon Tripoli and Benghazi by the Reagan Adminis-
tration was a classic case of what international law professors call actions of mili-
tary retaliation and reprisal.").
212 W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous.
J. INT'L L. 3, 34 (1999).
213 See Stephen Robinson, UN Support for Raid on Baghdad, DAILY TELE-
GRAPH (London), June 28, 1993, at 1 ("Countries in the United Nations Security
Council including Britain and France queued up last night to support America's
missile attack on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad. There was a wide-
spread feeling at the council's emergency meeting in New York that yesterday's
predawn raid . . . was justified following evidence that Iraq had been deeply in-
volved in an attempt to assassinate former President Bush."); Craig R. Whitney,
European Allies Are Giving Strong Backing to U.S. Raid, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1993, at A7 ("Russia said the action was justifiable self-defense in accordance with
the United Nations Charter .... )
214 See Robinson, supra note 213, at 1.
215 Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51
of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT'L L. J. 41, 49-50 (2002).
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the Sudan attack.216 Western European states supported the
U.S. actions to varying degrees, while Russian President Boris
Yeltsin said that he was "outraged" by the "indecent" behavior
of the United States. 217 Japan issued a statement saying it "un-
derstood American's resolute attitude towards terrorism."2 18
"Most Arab and Muslim Governments remained silent or equiv-
ocal about their views on the missile strikes."219 The U.N. Se-
curity Council discussed the matter briefly, and deferred
requests to send an international team of inspectors to the
bombed plant in Khartoum to search for evidence of chemical
weapons after the United States had declined a request from
Sudan to produce such evidence. 220 No action was taken either
by the Security Council or the General Assembly.22'
Turkey has moved forces to occupy areas in Iraq used by
Turkish Kurds to fight for their independence, and Russia has
threatened to attack Afghanistani bases that support Chechen
rebels- again with little or no comment at the U.N..222 There
have been numerous instances of Israeli occupation and out-
right destruction of PLO base areas in the ongoing conflict in
the Gaza strip, often enough with little discussion at the U.N.,
suggesting that the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense has be-
come firmly entrenched in customary international law.223 On
the other hand, in June 1981, the Israeli Air Force destroyed an
Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad, basing its action on antici-
patory self-defense. 224 In the Security Council, Israel's ambas-
sador argued that Israel had attempted to use diplomatic
channels to solve the problem, but these efforts proved ineffec-
tive, so that the only recourse was the use of force. 225 Israel was
216 See Phil Reeves, Outraged Yeltsin Denounces "Indecent" US Behaviour, IN-
DEPENDENT (London), Aug. 22, 1998, at 2.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Douglas Jehl, U.S. Raids Provoke Fury in Muslim World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 1998, at A6.
220 See Barbara Crossette, Judith Miller, Steven Lee Myers & Tim Weiner,
U.S. Says Iraq Aided Production Of Chemical Weapons in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 1998, at Al; see also Franck, supra note 28, at 61.
221 See Crossette, Miller, Meyers, & Weiner, supra note 220, at Al.
222 See Franck, supra note 28, at 61.
223 See id.
224 See AREND & BECK, supra note 201, at 77-78.
225 See id. at 77-78.
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roundly condemned for the attack, and even those who sup-
ported the idea of anticipatory self-defense seemed to suggest
that the threat of an armed attack by Iraq was not shown to be
imminent, and therefore self-defense was not justified.226
The United States and the United Kingdom have invoked
the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense in the no-fly zones in
Iraq to permit response not only to actual attacks on their air-
craft, but to cover the locking-on of Iraqi radar onto U.S. and
UK planes. 227 There has been no substantive objection from the
international community. 228
After terrorists attacked the United States on September
11, 2001, the international community agreed that even under a
restrictionist reading of Article 51, self-defense on the part of
the United States was justified.229 The U.N. Security Council,
for the first time in its history, approved a resolution explicitly
invoking and reaffirming the inherent right of a nation's self-
defense in response to the terrorist attacks. 230 The Security
Council implicitly described the September 11 terrorist attacks
as an "armed attack" under Article 51.231
The United States affirmed its inherent right of self-de-
fense under customary international law in a letter that the
United States Government sent to the U.N. Security Council on
226 See id. at 78-79.
227 See Davis Brown, Enforcing Arms Control Agreements by Military Force:
Iraq and the 800-Pound Gorilla, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 159, 207-08
(2003).
228 See id. at 214.
229 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 177-78.
230 U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12,
2001). Furthermore, Security Council Resolution 1368, which stated that the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001, constituted "a threat to international peace
and security," made it clear that the responsibility for terrorism of "sponsors of
these terrorist attacks" included those "supporting or harbouring the perpetra-
tors." Id. The Taliban would seem to clearly fit the description of "sponsors" of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This is supported by Draft articles on
state responsibility prepared by the International Law Commission that make it
clear that a state is responsible for the consequences of allowing its territory to be
used to injure another state. See International Law Commission, State Responsi-
bility: Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading,
General Principles, pt. 1, Arts. 9, 11, 21, & pt. 2, Arts. 40, 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
L.602/Revs.1, 2 (2001).
231 Jack M. Beard, Amercia's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-defense
Under International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 568 (2002).
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October 7, 2001, stating that it had "initiated actions in the ex-
ercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-de-
fence following the armed attacks that were carried out against
the United States on 11 September 2001."232 The U.S. Govern-
ment further stated, "Our inquiry is in its early stages. We may
find that our self-defence requires further actions with respect
to other organizations and other States."233 This assertion was
predicated on the belief that the September 11th terrorist at-
tacks were not isolated acts. They were part of an ongoing ter-
rorist campaign waged over a period of years, orchestrated by
the Al Qaeda leadership against the United States, including
the 1993 attack on U.S. military personnel in Somalia, the 1998
bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tarzania, unsuccess-
ful attempted bombings in Jordan and Los Angeles in 1999, and
the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 that killed seventeen crew
members and injured forty others. 234 Al Qaeda and Taliban
leaders have persisted in their vow to destroy America. 235
Clearly, in these instances, the U.N. has responded benevo-
lently or at least by silent acquiescence, when anticipatory force
has been used to prevent a demonstrably imminent and poten-
tially overwhelming threat to a state's security, as in the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
Thus, there appears to be no shortage of instances in which
the observance of Article 51's constraint on the use of force has
collapsed in actual practice. 236 Article 51's limitation on the use
of force in self-defense has become increasingly ignored and is
therefore "no longer regarded as obligatory by states."237 As
232 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America,
to the United Nations, Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Oct. 7,
2001), U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc.S/2001/946 (2001).
233 Id.
234 See Beard, supra note 231, at 587, n.95 (2002).
235 See id. at 588.
236 See Glennon, supra note 34, at 542.
237 Id. at 540. Another commentator has this to say about the evolution of
customary international law:
Where error has been detected as society has advanced, the customary
law has been gently modified; it has been modified by the same power to
which it owed its existence, and by which alone it can be modified-the
expressed or tacit consent of nations; and by this it may still further be
altered, when improvements shall be suggested by the greater progress of
human society.
MANNING, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF NATIONS 82 (Amos ed., 1875).
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mentioned above, once an international rule is no longer ob-
served by a significant number of states, its standing as part of
customary international law is called into question. That is
when a paradigm shift occurs in science as well as in politics.
As Michael Glennon observes:
The international system has come to subsist in a parallel uni-
verse of two systems, one de jure, the other de facto. The de jure
system consists of illusory rules that would govern the use of force
among states in a platonic world of forms, a world that does not
exist. The de facto system consists of actual state practice in the
real world, a world in which states weigh costs against benefits in
regular disregard of the rules solemnly proclaimed in the all-but-
ignored de jure system. The decaying de jure catechism is overly
schematized and scholastic, disconnected from state behavior,
and unrealistic in its aspirations for state conduct. 238
VII. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY
SELF-DEFENSE
The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is nothing new,
but is being deployed in a new world with new types of threats.
The doctrine appears to have gotten its initial imprimatur in
the words of then-Secretary of State Daniel Webster from the
Caroline case. 239 Webster claimed that to justify anticipatory
self-defense a state must demonstrate that "the necessity of
that self-defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation." 240 He added a fur-
ther caveat, which has come to be known as the proportionality
test, that the state must do "nothing unreasonable or excessive,
238 Glennon, supra note 34, at 540.
239 See JAMES BASSETT MOORE, Destruction of the Caroline, 2 A DIGEST OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW § 217 (1906). The Caroline incident occurred during a Canadian
insurrection against the Crown in 1837, when a British officer authorized an
armed band of marauders to cross into the United States to burn the Caroline, a
U.S. ship docked in port, and cut it loose, sending it crashing over Niagara Falls.
The officer believed that the ship was going to be used to provide support for the
insurrection. It is generally agreed that the British action was improper. Lord
Ashburton sent Webster a letter of apology for the incident. See RICHARD ERICK-
SON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED INTERNA-
TIONAL TERRORISM 142 (1989).
240 ERICKSON, st,9ra note 173, at 412.
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since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense must be
kept clearly within it."241
Anticipatory self-defense has a very narrow range in which
it can be legitimately deployed because it is restricted by the
requirements of immediacy, necessity, and proportionality. The
idea here is that the necessity of the use of force in the context
of anticipatory self-defense requires "immediacy," i.e., an immi-
nent threat with a corresponding immediate or closely temporal
response. 242 The immediacy requirement contemplates that the
response be temporally close to the threat of an armed at-
tack.243 The immediacy requirement takes into consideration
the amount of time between the threat of an attack and the mil-
itary response thereto.244 Thus, necessity and immediacy are
interrelated. The necessity of asserting self-defense depends on
the immediacy of the threatened attack.
This begs the question, how close in time must the
threatened attack be to the response in order to be considered
immediate? It is difficult to fit the immediacy requirement into
the nebulous mold of terrorist cells, terrorist plots, and rogue
regimes that are harboring terrorists and/or developing weap-
ons of mass destruction. There are distinct issues involved in
analyzing cases such as these: the tyrannical nature of the re-
gime, the evidence of past acts in violation of international law
involving genocide and deployment of chemical and biological
weapons, the harboring of terrorists, the sponsoring of ter-
rorists, and the development of weapons of mass destruction by
a tyrannical state. There is no algorithm to aid in distinguish-
ing between those instances where facts become as sufficiently
grave and immediate as to justify anticipatory self-defense, and
those that do not.
241 MOORE, supra note 239, at 2, § 217.
242 For example, Francis A. Boyle claimed that "this provision of the Charter
[Article 51] made it quite clear that self-defense could only be exercised in the
event of an actual or perhaps at least imminent 'armed attack' against the state
itself. By definition, this would not include military retaliation and reprisal since
they occur after the fact." Francis A. Boyle, Military Responses to Terrorism, 81
PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 288, 294 (1987).
243 See Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on U.S.:" Interna-
tional and Forcible State Response to Terrorism, 12 Wis. INT'L L.J. 153, 213 (1994).
244 See Mark Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-defense (A Call to
Amend the United Nations Charter) 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 25, 34 (1987).
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In connection with Operation Iraqi Freedom, critics may
question whether the United States was left without a choice of
means, or without a moment for deliberation before launching
its attack against Iraq, as a strict application of Caroline would
require. 245 Operation Iraqi Freedom was preceded by a deliber-
ate and careful build-up of military, diplomatic, and strategic
maneuvers that suggests that the necessity of the anticipatory
self-defense was not "instant."246 Arguably, in view of the dan-
ger of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a rogue
state, the necessity may well have been "overwhelming," and in
light of the evaporated diplomatic opportunities, the necessity
may well have left "no choice of means."247 The immediacy re-
quirement might rest on a claim that there was an ongoing
Iraqi threat to U.S. interests, rather than a recollection of prior
acts of terrorism or sponsorship of terrorism. 248 If a threat is
ongoing, then it is a threat in the present moment, suggesting
that the necessity of a response is satisfied by the immediacy of
the threat. It might be further argued that, despite this ongo-
ing immediate threat, diplomatic efforts were undertaken.
In the interim, coalition forces engaged in a policy of "con-
tainment" of the threat by enforcing "no-fly" zones, monitoring
Iraqi military and control centers by satellites and drones, and
proceeding with weapons inspections pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 1441.249 However, given that the threat was
not subsiding, and the Security Council was unwilling to pass
an enforcement resolution in connection with Resolution 1441,
particularly in the face of France's unwavering threat to veto
such a move despite what the United States and the United
Kingdom regarded as straightforward evidence of material
breach, I think that diplomatic efforts had come to an end and
the necessity for action was plain.250 Even so, the doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense may be insufficient to legitimize U.S.
intervention in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in light of the addi-
tional objective of affecting a regime-change. (But see discus-
245 See id. at 45.
246 Id. at 34.
247 Id. at 32.
248 But cf. Baker, supra note 244, at 34.
249 Posteraro, supra note 5, at 163.
250 See Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Gives Hussein 48 Hours, and Vows to Act,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at Al.
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sion below.) It is important to consider the totality of the
circumstances, referencing the prior acts which brought about
the present conflict, past acts of the target state, the nature of
the antagonism, the context of the relationship between the two
states, and the accumulation of evnts. The United States and
the United Kingdom were unable to convince the Security
Council that there was sufficient evidence to declare Iraq in ma-
terial breach of Resolution 1441.251 Evidence is inherently an
awkward problem, for reasonable people will differ as to what
quantum of evidence reaches a given threshold of
authoritativeness.
In 1998, President Clinton authorized the strike of terror-
ist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the
threat they posed to our national security. 252 He justified the
targeting on what he characterized as "convincing" evidence of
their involvement in attacks of United States embassies in Ke-
nya and Tanzania, which caused the deaths of some twelve
Americans and nearly three hundred Kenyans and Tanzani-
ans.253 He added that the strike was further justified because
there was "compelling information" that terrorists were plan-
ning additional terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and
others. 254 It is well worth noting that President Clinton did not
share this "compelling information." The evidentiary support
for this and other instances of American use of force against
states supporting terrorists has been a topic of criticism. Some
critics have argued that the United States has shown "consis-
tent disregard of evidentiary showings" in such cases and that it
has effectively taken the stance that its factual assertions ought
to be considered unreviewable. 255 In the 1986 Libya bombing,
the Reagan Administration declined to fully disclose what it
deemed to be compelling evidence gleaned from intercepted
251 See Brown, supra note 227, at 219.
252 See Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Af-
ghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460, 1460 (Aug. 20, 1998).
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing
of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 548, 553 (1999).
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communications between Tripoli and the Libyan Embassy in
East Berlin.256
A similar evidentiary criticism was raised regarding the al-
leged plot to kill former President Bush that resulted in the
1993 cruise missile attack on the Iraqi Intelligence Service
Complex. 257 Commentators criticized the U.S. Government for
failing to disclose relevant facts and for its statements unilater-
ally characterizing those facts. 258 No such criticism was voiced
against the U.S. Government after the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, perhaps because officials made presentations of rele-
vant sensitive and classified information to a number of foreign
governments and subjected this evidence to considerable
scrutiny.259
Often enough the deliberations of the Security Council are
affected profoundly, if not decisively, by the quality of informa-
tion presented. Thus, the overwhelming evidence presented
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the immediacy of the
threat, may be contrasted to the less clear, and proximately
more distant evidence presented to the Security Council regard-
ing the enforcement of violations of Resolution 1441. I would
suggest that in any case in which a state asserts military action
based on anticipatory self-defense, there needs to be a credible
pronouncement by military leaders of the existence of compel-
ling evidence that a rogue state is actually supporting interna-
256 Bob Woodward & Patrick E. Tyler, Libyan Cables Intercepted and Decoded,
WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al. Eleven years after the incident, during the trial
of persons who were employed by or affiliated with the Libyan embassy in East
Berlin for complicity in the discoteque bombing, decoded transcripts were released
indicating that Libyan authorities had ordered the raid and that Libyan operatives
in Berlin had confirmed the successful attack. On November 13, 2001, four people,
including one Libyan diplomat and a Libyan Embassy worker, were convicted of
the bombing, after prosecutors had argued that Libya was guilty of "state-spon-
sored terrorism." Steven Erlanger, 4 Guilty in 1986 Disco Bombing Linked to
Libya, in West Berlin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at A5.
257 See Seymour Hersh, A Case Not Closed, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 1993, at
80.
258 See Lobel, supra, note 255, at 547.
259 See Beard, supra note 231, at 576. Following the United States' briefing of
the North Atlantic Council, the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, said:
"The facts are clear and compelling. The information presented points conclusively
to an Al-Qaida role in the 11 September attacks." Statement by NATO Secretary
General Lord Robertson (Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.nato.intldocu/
speech/200l/sO11002a.htm.
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tional terrorism and/or is in possession or in active pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction.
The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, as suggested by
the Caroline case, contemplates "leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation. '26 0 That suggests a require-
ment to seek diplomatic solutions whenever possible, and to
give fair warning to the offending state before striking. That is
precisely what is already called for under Article 2(3) of the
U.N. Charter, which requires all members to "settle their inter-
national disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that in-
ternational peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered."261
How long diplomacy should continue depends in part on the
imminence and seriousness of the threat, and whether reasona-
ble prospects that diplomacy will result in a satisfactory solu-
tion exist. The difficulty with anticipatory self-defense is that a
state can seldom be absolutely certain about the other state's
intentions. In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the facts
that preceded the military deployment cannot be taken in isola-
tion, but must be considered in light of the surrounding circum-
stances, both in the circumstances of international terrorism
and in the light of the past practices of Saddam Hussein. The
threat from such a regime is exacerbated when the regime has a
demonstrable history of acts of international aggression,
262
against Iran in the 1980s, Kuwait in 1990, and a history of fail-
ing to live up to its agreements. While the possession of nuclear
weapons has been accepted by the international community, the
international community has an entirely different attitude
when weapons of mass destruction fall into the hands of perfidi-
ous regimes such as Iraq that engage in state-sponsored terror-
ism, fail to respect human rights, and even indicate a
260 MOORE, supra note 239, at 412.
261 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 3.
262 See Theodor Meron, Defining Aggression for the International Criminal
Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 15 n.21 (2001). While the term, "aggres-
sion," has a long and controversial history, most notably in the Nuremberg Trial
and in the consideration of crimes authorized for prosecution under the Interna-
tional Criminal Courts, I think we can consider aggression in a common sense ap-
plication that everyone can agree upon. Id.
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willingness to deploy weapons of mass destruction against its
own peoples. 263
While international law invariably calls upon states to al-
ways first appeal to diplomatic solutions in dealing with the
possibility of declaring war, the more imminent and dangerous
the perceived threat, the swifter an end to diplomacy there
must be because of the dire cost of incessant delay. Diplomatic
deliberations cannot go on endlessly. "The seriousness of the
threat and the profound cost of prolonged delay make reliance
on a doctrine of exhaustion of peaceful alternatives too burden-
some to contemplate." 264 Should diplomatic appeals fail, there
should be a strong preference for persuading allies to join us
and avoid unilateral action. But failing that, unilateral action
against terrorist states is far better than the danger of pro-
longed inertia. Of course, there is always a preference against
unilateral action. Michael Glennon has noted that "[hlistory is
not without examples of exploitative alliances, but the greater
abuses by far occur when states act unilaterally. The need to
persuade allies to join in intervention makes it less likely that
the intervention will be for ulterior motives."265
The Caroline266 doctrine, while addressing anticipatory
self-defense, is applied in cases that involve self-defense in re-
sponse to direct armed attacks under Article 51.267 Customary
international law provides that a state's response to an armed
attack under Article 51 be immediate, necessary, and propor-
tionate to the attack, just as in the case of a threatened attack.
The Caroline requirements in the context of Article 51 self-de-
fense have been described in many ways by many commenta-
tors. During discussions of the General Assembly in 1965, the
delegate from Mexico described these requirements as follows:
For the use of force in self defense to be permissible under the
Charter, such force must . .. be immediately subsequent to and
proportional to the armed attack to which it was an answer. If
excessively delayed or excessively severe it ceased to be self-de-
263 See generally RICHARD BUTLER, THE GREATEST THREAT 11, 18 (1999).
264 Posteraro, supra note 5, at 206.
265 MICHAEL GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW AND PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVEN-
TIONISM AFTER Kosovo 198-99 (2001).
266 See People v. Mclead, 25 U.S. (1 Pet.) 483, 505 (1841).
267 See Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The Caroline Incident and the
Development of International Law, BROOK. J. INT'L L. 493, 496 (1990).
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fense and became a reprisal which was an action inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.
2 68
The notion of necessity and immediacy in the context of
self-defense under an Article 51 armed attack is entirely differ-
ent than in a case of anticipatory self-defense in response to a
threatened attack. According to the doctrine of anticipatory
self-defense, the necessity for a military response is directly cor-
related to the imminence of the threat.269 If an enemy's missile
has been launched against a target state's territory and is
therefore on its way, there is no time for diplomacy, and the
necessity for self-defensive action by way of deploying an anti-
ballistic missile is clear under the Caroline doctrine. The state
need only demonstrate that an attack was truly imminent, and
that there was essentially no other reasonably peaceful means
available to prevent such attack.
As evidenced in the above-quoted commentary on self-de-
fense in the context of an Article 51 armed attack, there is a
conflation of the "immediacy" requirement of Caroline.270 Re-
garding an armed attack, the above passage applies the notion
of immediacy to the period of time following an armed attack
rather than the period between the threat of attack and the an-
ticipated accomplishment thereof, as contemplated by the Caro-
line case. 271
More to the point, the very notion of self-defense is a misno-
mer if used as a response to an armed attack. Once an attack
occurs, a response no longer qualifies a self-defense in that the
damage has already been done. When a claimant state's attack
on a target state follows an actual armed attack, this after the
fact response, even if immediate, takes on the form of a studied,
premeditated attack that no longer serves the purpose, strictly
speaking, of self-defense. 272 Such a response no longer qualifies
as self-defense, but rather as retaliation, reprisal, or prevention
of an anticipated further attack. In fact, this fairly describes
the Reagan-era doctrine of "swift and effective retribution"
268 G.A. Res. 886, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 42, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/886
(1965).
269 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 180-81.
270 Posteraro, supra note 5, at 181.
271 Id.
272 See id.
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against terrorist organizations that strike U.S. interests.27 3
The policy of swift retribution has become a plausible part of
customary international law, as evidenced by its use in Presi-
dent Clinton's air strikes against Iraq for the attempted assas-
sination of George H.W. Bush in 1993, and his strikes against
Sudan and Afghanistan following the Embassy Bombings in
Tanzania and Kenya in 1998.274 But it is implausible to sug-
gest that "swift retribution" is the same thing as self-defense.
The only coherent sense of self-defense is in the context of
engagement. For example, if someone approaches me with a
knife, I will need to deflect the blow prior to getting hurt in or-
der to engage in self-defense. The right of self-defense entitles
me to attack someone who is attacking me, in order to fend off
his aggression. On the other hand, if he strikes and flees, my
subsequent attack is not an act of self-defense, but is retalia-
tion. It is a contradiction to characterize a post-attack response
as self-defense. Indeed, under the criminal law, I would likely
be charged with assault for such a response. Thus, under this
analysis, Article 51 is not really a protocol pertaining to self-
defense, but pertains to the permissibility of retaliatory strikes
in response to an armed attack.
Also problematic, self-defense requires mobilization of con-
siderable resources, personnel, detailed coordination, and plan-
ning for various contingencies. Therefore, it is logistically
implausible to launch an immediate self-defense strike except
in cases where the parties already have daggers drawn in the
battlefront arena. A strict interpretation of the immediacy re-
quirement in the context of both a threatened and an armed
attack would seem to be, particularly in the context of terrorist
threats, somewhat hamstringing. Such a requirement
could prohibit almost all 'after the fact' acts of self-defense except
those that are immediately necessary to repel an attack or pre-
vent being overwhelmed. Such a strict and self-defeating version
of necessity expansively based on the Caroline test does not ap-
pear to be consistent with the right of self-defense under custom-
ary international law and has been vigorously opposed by a
273 WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM: A TWENTY-FivE YEAR BALANCE SHEET
307, 316 (Ronald Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid eds., 1992).
274 See Bonafede, supra note 29, at 179, 184.
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number of writers, particularly in the context of fighting
terrorism. 27 5
VIII. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
Proportionality has come to be a fundamental jus belli (law
of war) principle of customary international law, and holds that
when a state engages in acts of warfare (whether offensive or
defensive), its use of force must be limited to force that is pro-
portionate to the opponent's attack.2 7 6 That is, the response
must be proportionate to the attack, rather than punitive or
retaliatory in scope. While proportionality is not mentioned in
the text of Article 51, the concept has been regarded as part of
the notion of self-defense. 277 Stated as early as the Caroline
case, a state must do "nothing unreasonable or excessive, since
the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense must be kept
clearly within it. '' 278 The United States, recognizing this to be
the case, indicated in its report to the U.N. Security Council its
response to the 1993 cruise missile attack on the Iraqi Intelli-
gence Service complex.279 When a certain quantum of military
damage is exceeded, a state's response may be deemed a repri-
sal rather than a proportionate response, and accordingly ille-
gal under both the U.N. Charter and customary international
275 Beard, supra note 231, at 586; see also William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deter-
rence and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 471
(1990) (arguing that in an era of terrorism, the "interpretation of necessity is very
different from that in a singular incident along the U.S.-Canadian border in
1837").
276 See Nicar. v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 176 (June 27) in which the Inter-
national Court of Justice noted that it is well established customary international
law that self-defense warrants "only measures which are proportional to the armed
attack and necessary to respond to it."
277 See id. The International Court of Justice stated in the Nicaragua case
that the pre-existing requirements of proportionality govern the defensive use of
force under Article 51. See id. at 94.
278 MOORE, supra note 239, at 2, § 217.
279 See U.N.SCOR, 53d Sess:, 780th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/1998/780 (1998).
"The targets struck, and the timing and method of attack used, were carefully de-
signed to minimize risks of collateral damage to civilians and to comply with inter-
national law, including the rules of necessity and proportionality." Letter from the
Permanent Representatives of the United States of America, to the United Na-
tions, Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Aug. 20, 1998). Id.
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law. 280 As mentioned above, it is my opinion that any after-
the- fact response to an armed attack ought to be properly char-
acterized as a reprisal in the first instance. At any rate, the
proportionality test applies regardless of whether one charac-
terizes the deployment as offensive or defensive.
In 1970, the General Assembly declared, "[S]tates have a
duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of
force." 281 The Security Council has condemned the dispropor-
tionate use of force as reprisals. 2 2 The Security Council has
condemned Israel for attacking the Beirut International Air-
port on December 28, 1968, in response to an attack by two
members of an Arab extremist group known as the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine ("PLO"). 28 3 Two PLO
members had attacked an El Al passenger aircraft at the Ath-
ens airport two days earlier, killing one passenger.28 4 Israel's
attack resulted in the destruction of thirteen aircraft totalling
approximately $43.8 million in damages, but no loss of life.28 5
Rather than exercise their right to self-defense, the Israelis ar-
gued that it was "their right to retaliate against Lebanon for
their complicity with the Athens incident. '28 6 Three days after
the retaliation, the Security Council voted unanimously on a
resolution that condemned Israel's actions, stating the attack
was "premeditated and of a larger scale and carefully planned
nature. 1287
Some consider the allied force bombings necessary to expel
Iraq from its invasion of Kuwait during the 1990-91 Gulf War
as disproportionate.288 Many thought that President Clinton's
action, in the 1993 Afghanistan-Sudan attack, was somewhat
280 See Bowett, supra note 26, at 1 ("Few propositions about international law
have enjoyed more support than the proposition that, under the Charter of the
United Nations, the use of force by way of reprisals is illegal.").
281 BROWNLIE, supra note 178, at 38.
282 See id.
283 See Baker, supra note 244, at 34.
284 See id.
285 See Baker, supra note 244, at 34.
286 Id. at 35.
287 Id.
288 See, e.g., Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International
War, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 405 (1993) ("It appears that more was done than was
proportionate to expelling Iraq from Kuwait.").
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disproportionate and unreasonable. 28 9 The counterargument
was that the action was taken to eradicate the terrorist cells, to
deter future terrorist incidents, and to punish past attacks. 290
In addition, the President justified military action on the terri-
tory of two foreign nations because their sovereigns had "har-
bor[ed]" and "support[ed]" terrorist groups for years, despite
warnings from the United States. 291
In Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States sought
to justify its attack on Afghanistan based on the premise that
the Taliban regime harboured terrorists that attacked the
United States on September 11, 2001. It has been argued that
the invasion and overthrow of the Taliban regime was dispro-
portionate to the "armed attack" if indeed the terrorist attacks
constituted an armed attack in the first instance, under Article
51.292
Evidently, the Security Council has taken the position that
reprisals are disproportionate and unlawful in connection with
the assertion of self-defense under Article 51. However, despite
the position taken by the United Nations, the proportionality
test itself has undergone a significant shift in actual state prac-
tice, suffering from a "credibility gap. '29 3 We no longer live in
an age in which "[tihe difference between the right of self-de-
fense and the right of retaliation is quite obvious to any first
year student at any law school or any institution of legal stud-
ies."294 Moreover, a strictly proportionate act of self-defense is
nothing more than illusory in terms of whether it can compel a
satisfactory settlement of the dispute provoked by the target
state. Clearly, in order for self-defense to be meaningful, it
must be effective. Reprisals and punitive measures are justified
in certain cases rather than tit-for-tat military moves because
an act of reprisal offers a more secure form of protection for the
289 See Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional
Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the
Nations That Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 488, 510 (Spr.
2002).
290 See id. at 509.
291 See id.
292 See Glennon, supra note 34, at 546.
293 See Bowett, supra note 26, at 1.
294 Statement by the Soviet representative in the U.N. Security Council in the
course of the debate on the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in 1964. U.N. SCOR, 19th
Sess., ll41st mtg., at paras. 82-83.
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future by acting as a deterrent against further acts of aggres-
sion. Some scholars assert that armed reprisals can be legiti-
mate if in the nature of "defensive retaliation," to prevent
future attacks.295 Under this formulation, "[a]rmed reprisals do
not qualify as legitimate self-defense if they are impelled by
purely punitive, non-defensive, motives .... [A]rmed reprisals
must be future-oriented, and not limited to a desire to punish
past transgressions. '296 In a similar vein, the U.S. Army Law of
Land Warfare provides the following definition of reprisals:
Reprisals are acts of retaliation in the form of conduct which
would otherwise be unlawful, resorted to by one belligerent
against enemy personnel or property for acts of warfare commit-
ted by the other belligerent in violation of the law of war, for the
purpose of enforcing future compliance with the recognized rules
of civilized warfare. 297
In the context of terrorist attacks, and the response thereto,
it is difficult to ascertain a dividing line between reprisals legit-
imately related to self-defense, and those that are "purely puni-
tive."298 Retaliatory measures are sometimes justified within
the context of proportionality when the aim is to respond to and
deter terrorist attacks. One commentator suggests, "If propor-
tionality consists of a reasonable relation of means to ends, it
would not be disproportionate if in some cases the retaliatory
force exceeded the original attack to serve its deterrent aim."299
Even those who argue for a restrictionist right of self-de-
fense under Article 51 concede that once an armed attack has
occurred, it is consistent with necessity and proportionality for
the aggrieved state "both to repel the armed attack and to take
the war to the aggressor State in order effectively to terminate
295 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 208 (1988).
296 DINSTEIN, supra note 295, at 208.
297 Dept. of the Army, Washington, 25, D.C., 18 July 1956, Field Manual No.
27-10, Ch. 8, § I, Para. 497(a).
298 Guy Roberts, Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
318, 318 (1987).
299 Oscar Schachter, The Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Ba-
ses, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 309, 315 (1989). See also, Roberts, supra note 50, at 318
(arguing that some military reprisals cannot be distinguished from legitimate acts
of self-defense).
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the attack and prevent a recurrence."30 0 As long ago as 50 years
a commentator on international law had remarked:
It cannot be supposed that the inviolability of territory is so sacro-
sanct as to mean that a state may harbour within its territory the
most blatant preparation for an assault upon another state's inde-
pendence with impunity; the inviolability of territory is subject to
the use of that territory in a manner which does not involve a
threat to the rights of other states.301
More recently, another commentator has spoken for an an-
ticipatory self-defense doctrine as follows: "If a state has devel-
oped the capability of inflicting substantial harm upon another,
indicated explicitly or implicitly its willingness or intent to do
so, and to all appearances is waiting only for the opportunity to
strike."30 2
Clearly, a restrictionist view of Article 51's notion of self-
defense is no longer viable. The doctrine of anticipatory self-
defense takes on a heightened urgency when terrorists within a
state plot to conduct operations against another state. Still,
critics may well claim that the doctrine of anticipatory self-de-
fense does not adequately fit the circumstances of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. While Iraq had already demonstrated its capac-
ity to inflict substantial harm on other states, it is not clear (at
least from evidence available to the public at the present time)
that it had indicated its willingness or intention to inflict harm
upon the United States or its allies, and that it was simply wait-
ing for the right opportunity to strike. A more compelling case
might be made if there had been more convincing evidence that
terrorist cells in Iraq, supported by the regime, were planning
terrorist operations against the United States and its allies, and
waiting for an opportunity to strike.
IX. PROPORTIONALITY AND THE GOAL OF REGIME-CHANGE
Even under an expansive view of anticipatory self-defense,
we are still faced with the hurdle of justifying a regime-change
concomitant with anticipatory self-defense. When a state seeks
300 Henkin, supra note 172, at 39-40 (emphasis added).
301 BOWETT, supra note 167, at 54.
302 Michael Glennon, Self-defense and Incoherence in the U.N. Charter, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 552 (2002).
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to justify an attack based on the doctrine of anticipatory self-
defense, the doctrine of proportionality perseveres. This chal-
lenges the military campaign where victory is spelled out by a
regime-change through the use of force. Such an objective
would seem to be disproportionate. As one commentator put it,
"[p]roportionality likely does not support the invocation of the
doctrine of self-defense for interventions where the explicit pur-
pose is the ouster of a threatening regime."30 3 Under this view,
proportionality would, quite plausibly, never allow overthrow-
ing a government regime even if it is the active sponsor of ter-
rorists within its borders. 30 4
A strict application of the proportionality principle in the
context of anticipatory self-defense would, at best, permit at-
tacking the opponent's military and command elements and fa-
cilities and material used in connection with developing and
stockpiling weapons of mass destruction, but it may be stretch-
ing the doctrine to include removing the sovereign himself. Un-
less a tyrant such as Saddam Hussein is removed, merely
driving out his terrorist cells and disarming him from weapons
of mass destruction may only contain rather than eliminate the
threat. Thus, factoring in a regime-change would seem to be a
component that needs to be given serious consideration in a
newly emerging paradigm shift involving anticipatory self-de-
fense. As Michael J. Glennon comments, "[M aced with weapons
of mass destruction, very little in the way of military response is
actually disproportionate," against a brutal regime that
harbours terrorists.305 A first strike of nuclear weapons, on the
other hand, surely would be illicit.30 6 While the mission in at-
tacking a rogue state is not to conquer and divide it, at the same
time, "[a]bsolutely pure motives cannot be reasonably required"
in such cases, for "[tihe overthrow of a ruling regime will fre-
quently be a necessary goal . . . ,,307 Clearly, this is the case in
Iraq, where despite previous efforts to destroy the regime's
weapons of mass destruction, the arsenal of weapons simply
grew back, and there was no evidence that Saddam Hussein
303 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 181.
304 See Glennon, supra note 34, at 546.
305 Id.
306 See id.
307 Id.
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was willing to relinquish his weapons or his desire to harbour
and cultivate terrorists.
Effecting a regime-change takes on the broader purpose of
a humanitarian mission in cases such as Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, in which the people are being liberated from a tyrannical
regime that has violated fundamental human rights and com-
mitted acts of genocide and other crimes against humanity. 308
Thomas Franck has argued that it is proper to use force to pro-
mote democratic self-determination in support of the notion
that certain regimes are illegitimate, by engaging in gross viola-
tions of human rights, or wielding power in total disregard of
constitutional processes. 30 9 Utilizing force to affect a regime-
change is an exception to Article 2(4) rather than a form of self-
defense. Franck believes that
[w]hen the most basic of [civil and political rights] have been
found to have been violated-and only then-an enunciated inter-
national consensus might now be ready to form around the pro-
position that the use of some levels of force by states could be
justified to secure democratic entitlements for peoples unable to
secure them for themselves. 310
The most recent precedent for a regime-change for the sake
of promoting democratic self-determination was Operation En-
during Freedom, in which coalition forces sought out and af-
fected a regime-change to end the stranglehold of the Taliban in
Afghanistan.3 11 Another recent example was the invasion of
Panama by the United States on the grounds that the govern-
ment of Manuel Noriega was illegitimate, and that this illegiti-
macy gave rise to a unilateral right to invade the country.31 2
Another example was the limited humanitarian intervention in
308 It is quite plausible, however, that, in the context of Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, the purpose of effecting a regime-change is associated more with the antici-
patory self-defense justification than with the purpose of humanitarian
intervention.
309 See AREND & BECK, supra note 201, at 192.
310 Id. at 192 (1993) (quoting Thomas Franck, "Secret Warfare: Policy Options
for a Modern Legal and Institutional Context," Paper presented to the Conference
on Policy Alternatives to Deal with Secret Warfare: International Law, U.S. INSTI-
TUTE OF PEACE, Mar. 16-17, 1990, at 18). See also, Thomas Franck, The Emerging
Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
311 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 154.
312 See AREND & BECK, supra note 201, at 193.
20031
61
PACE INT'L L. REV.
Grenada in 1983 to free the people "from the tyranny of the
thugs who had machine-gunned their way into power."313 Yet
another example was the unanimous resolution of the U.N.
General Assembly in 1991, demanding that its member states
take "action to bring about the diplomatic isolation of those who
hold power illegally in Haiti" and "suspend their economic, fi-
nancial, and commercial ties" with the country until democratic
rule is restored. 314
Many commentators think that tyrannies are illegitimate,
given the modern evolution of human rights law.315 Anthony
D'Amato remarked as follows:
I argue that human rights law demands intervention against tyr-
anny. I do not argue that intervention is justified to establish de-
mocracy, aristocracy, socialism, communism or any other form of
government. But if any of these forms of government become in
the Aristotelian sense corrupted, resulting in tyranny against
their population-and I regard "tyranny" as occurring when those
who have monopolistic control of the weapons and instruments of
suppression in a country turn those weapons and instruments
against their own people-I believe that intervention from outside
is not only legally justified but morally required.316
D'Amato adds, "The U.S. interventions in Panama and,
previously, in Grenada are milestones along the path to a new
nonstatist conception of international law that changes previ-
ous noninterventions formulas.. ,,317 He further points out
that "[a] glance at the Preamble to the U.N. Charter reveals its
affirmation of 'faith in fundamental human rights,' 'social pro-
gress,' and 'economic and social advancement of all peoples';
there is no mention of national autonomy."3 18
313 Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyr-
anny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 523 (1990).
314 Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/
RES.1/91, corr. 1, paras. 5, 6 (1991).
315 See D'Amato, supra note 22, at 519.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 517.
318 D'Amato, supra note 22, at 518. This additional passage of D'Amato is well
worth quoting:
We are better off with rules of international law that at least point us to
important factual and contextual considerations than we are with rules
that point us only to an endless series of subrules, explanatory rules and
learned commertary regarding the interpretation of all those rules-com-
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I would suggest that the permissibility, if not the obliga-
tion, to deploy offensive military action in order to affect hu-
manitarian intervention, discussed below, appears to have
become a part of customary international law. This doctrine
can justify the use of force to affect a regime-change when a
dictator evinces an ongoing pattern of behavior that involves in-
ternational crimes such as genocide, the killing of citizens with-
out due process, and other crimes against humanity.
X. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Humanitarian intervention involves coercive military ac-
tion for the purpose of protecting people who are subjected to
crimes against humanity. 319 The United Kingdom Foreign Sec-
mentary that then itself must be interpreted. The important factual and
contextual considerations in the present case, I submit, are whether the
people of Panama were helpless under a tyrannical rule and deserved, in
morality and in law, aid from an outside power to remove the unlawful
government that was brutalizing them. The factual situation of the peo-
ple of Panama cannot be found in consulting textbooks on the legality and
exceptions regarding the use of force in international law.
Id. at 521-22.
319 The general criteria of crimes against humanity have been defined by the
International Law Commission of the United Nations in its Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind. See Robert Rosenstock, The Forty-
eighth Session of the International Law Commission, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 367
(1997). The Code recognizes that a crime against humanity can be committed in
time of war or peace. Article 18, "Crimes against humanity," provides:
A crime against humanity means any of the following acts, when commit-
ted in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed
by a Government or by any organization or group:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) torture;
(d) enslavement;
(e) persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds;
(f) institutionalize discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious
grounds involving the violation of fundamental human rights and
freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the
population;
(g) arbitrary deportation of persons;
(h) arbitrary imprisonment;
(i) forced disappearance of persons;
Ci) rape, enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse;
(k) other inhumane acts which severely damage physical or mental
integrity, health or human dignity, such as mutilation and severe
bodily harm.
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retary described the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as
being newly emergent customary international law that allows
armed force to be used
as a last resort to avert overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe
that a government has shown it is unwilling or unable to prevent
or is actively promoting; it must be objectively clear that there is
no practicable alternative to the use of force to save lives; the use
of force should be proportionate to the humanitarian purpose and
likely to achieve its objectives; any use of force should be
collective. 320
Formerly, it was widely acknowledged that the U.N. Char-
ter regards unilateral humanitarian intervention as a violation
of state sovereignty and a violation of the use of force prohibited
by Article 2(4).321 On the other hand, some argue that humani-
tarian intervention does not violate Article 2(4) because it is not
a use of force against the "territorial integrity" or "political inde-
pendence" of any state.322 Since the interventions in Somalia,
Rwanda and Kosovo, the majority of the international commu-
nity has recognized the tragedy of ignoring widespread, acute
human suffering, and the legitimacy of coercive humanitarian
intervention, particularly when the U.N. Security Council fails
to act.323 The United Nations failed to allow its troops stationed
See Rosenstock, supra note 319, at 367, n.12.
320 Gray, supra note 128, at 10.
321 Article 2(4) states: "All members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4)
322 See John Norton Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145, 154 (1984).
323 See, e.g., T.M. Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of
Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2002); W. Moorman, Hu-
manitarian Intervention and International Law in the Case of Kosovo, 36 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 775 (2002); D.H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and
a More Persuasive Paradigm, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 597 (2002); C. Poltak, Humanita-
rian Intervention: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, 60 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1 (2002); M. Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force
and International Law After 11 September, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401 (2002); M.
Koskenniemi, 'The Lady doth protest too much': Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in
International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159 (2002); D. Wippman, Kosovo and the Lim-
its of International Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 129 (2001); NATO's Bombing of
Kosovo Under International Law: Symposium, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 95 (2001);
A.M. Weisburd, International Law and the Problem of Evil, 34 VAND. J. TRANs-
NAT'L L. 225 (2001); A.D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT'L
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in Rwanda to intervene in order to stop the 1994 mass murder
of 800,000 Tutsi people.324 If a "coalition of the willing" had not
intervened in defense of the Tutsi population, but instead
awaited Security Council authorization, many more innocent
lives would have been lost in the genocide that was taking
place. 325 Seeking permission for humanitarian intervention
from the Security Council, in view of its failure in the past to
recognize this as a principle that justifies the deployment of
force, would appear to be a futile and unavailing gesture.
States that promote humanitarian intervention are not in-
clined to act within the U.N. system, but instead seek action
through regional coalitions, such as Haiti in 1994 and Kosovo
in 1999.326 This approach emphasizes "the legitimacy (not le-
gality) of the action under both the spirit of the U.N. Charter
and basic notions of state responsibility to prevent human
atrocities."327 If Kosovo is to serve as an example of justifiable
humanitarian intervention without seeking U.N. Security
Council approval, that claim may be bolstered by the fact that
Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave his implicit blessing to the
NATO air campaign, citing it as an example of force that was
necessary for the restoration of peace.
328
L. 1 (2000); J.D. Wilets, Lessons from Kosovo: Towards a Multiple Track System of
Human Rights Protection, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 645 (2000); B.S. Brown,
Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1683 (2000);
I. Arias, Humanitarian Intervention: Could the Security Council Kill the United
States?, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1005 (2000); G.H. Aldrich, The Laws of War on
Land, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 42 (2000); R.A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future
of International Law, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 847 (1999); W.M. Reisman, Kosovo's Antin-
omies, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 860 (1999); T.M. Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 857 (1999); 0. Bring, After Kosovo: NATO Should Formulate a Doctrine on
Humanitarian Intervention?, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. (USAFA) 61 (1999/2000); C.C.
Joyner, et al., Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention: An Emerging Legal Norm ?,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. (USAFA) 27 (1999/2000); G.A. Symes, Force Without Law: Seek-
ing a Legal Justification for the September 1996 U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq,
2 MICH. J. INT'L L. 581 (1998); J. Currie, NATO's Humanitarian Intervention in
Kosovo: Making or Breaking International Law?, 36 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 303 (1998);
M.L. Burton, Legalizing the Sublegal: A Proposal for Codifying a Doctrine of Uni-
laterial Humanitarian Intervention, 85 GEo. L.J. 417 (1996).
324 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 195.
325 See id. at 186.
326 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 195.
327 Id.
328 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 195.
2003]
65
PACE INT'L L. REV [Vol. 15:283
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has become an
authoritative norm of international law based in state practice
and opiniojuris.329 Since the interventions in Somalia, Rwanda
and Kosovo, the majority of the international community has
recognized the tragedy of ignoring widespread, acute human
suffering, and the legitimacy of coercive humanitarian interven-
tion despite the U.N. Security Council's failure to act.330
Moreover, the old argument that humanitarian interven-
tion is an affront to sovereignty appears to have lost promi-
nence as well. The notion of state sovereignty has undergone a
paradigm shift in modern times. Sovereignty was classically
defined as the "[s]upremacy of authority or rule... [rloyal rank,
power, or authority . .. [t]otal independence and self govern-
ment . .. ,331 However, the recent report of the Tnternational
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ("ICISS")
describes a shift "from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as
responsibility in both internal functions and external duties. ' '332
This marks a positive shift in the concept of sovereignty, which
has previously been characterized as the right of a state to exer-
cise supreme power over its territory and citizens free from
outside interference. The ICISS concluded that "[w]here a pop-
ulation is suffering serious harm... and the state in question is
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-inter-
vention yields to the international responsibility to protect."333
This suggests that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is
329 See Joyner & Arend, supra note 160, at 39. A two-part test has been sug-
gested for the purpose of analyzing whether a putative norm of international law
has become a binding customary rule of international law:
First, any rule of international law must be authoritative: states must
regard the norm as legitimate and they must consider it binding law. In
the traditional parlance of international law, the norm must reflect opin-
ion juris. Second, the prospective legal norm must control state behavior:
through their practice, states must actually comply with the requirements
of the rule. Neither 100% compliance nor 100% perception of authority is
required .... However, a general perception of authority, and regular,
widespread compliance are necessary [for a rule to be binding].
Beck & Arend, supra note 243, at 156-58 (1994) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
330 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 196.
331 WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1995).
332 The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, ch. 2.14 (2001), available at http:ll
www.idrc.ca/books/960and961/02_Protect.html.
333 Id. Synopsis (1).
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not merely permissive, but is an affirmative duty on the parts of
other states. The ICISS Report recognizes both the responsibil-
ity of every state to protect its citizens and the responsibility of
the international community to act to protect citizens whose
states have failed to provide protection. 334 This concept of a
duty to protect a population suffering harm under the auspices
of a state regime conflicts with the traditional and outmoded
custom of non-intervention. Under the new view, the duties of
sovereigns are as important as the rights of sovereigns. "It is
not a significant stretch of this logic to conclude that states,
therefore, must also have a responsibility to protect their own
citizens from other states who threaten them."
335
David Luban suggests that, "clearly, aggression violates a
state's rights only when the state possesses these rights."336 He
adds: "According to contract theory this entails that the state
has been legitimized by the consent of its citizens. An illegiti-
mate state, that is, one governing without the consent of the
governed is, therefore, morally, if not legally estopped from as-
serting a right against aggression." 337 He further says that "an
illegitimate and tyrannical state cannot derive sovereign rights
against aggression from the rights of its own oppressed citizens,
when it itself is denying them those same rights."338 We should
consider which the greater evil is: the continuation of a tyran-
nical and murderous regime, or an intervention to defend so-
cially basic human rights.
Luban's theory challenges the controversial thesis of
Michael Walzer, who believes that states which oppress their
people may be considered legitimate in international law as
long as they do not fall under what he calls the "rules of disre-
gard."3 39 Walzer claims that intervention is wrong, even when
a state's political institutions or practices violate whatever
moral standards are appropriate to them, when a state is "actu-
334 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 201.
335 Posteraro, supra note 5, at 201.
336 David Luban, Just War and Human Rights, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 169
(1980).
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 See Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Crit-
ics, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209 (1980).
2003]
67
PACE INT'L L. REV.
ally illegitimate."340 An illegitimate state may be "presump-
tively legitimate," where there is "a certain 'fit' between the
community and its government," such that the state may be re-
garded as "a people governed in accordance with its own tradi-
tions."341 As long as there is such a "fit," foreigners must
refrain from intervening because this is "simply the respect
that foreigners owe to a historic community and its internal
life."342 Walzer further claims that "the history, culture, and
religion of the community may be such that authoritarian re-
gimes come, as it were, naturally, reflecting a widely shared
world view of life."343 Moreover, other states are not positioned
to judge accurately whether "fit" is present; they will lack the
necessary historical and political understanding.344 Although
hard to believe, some people may want their tyranny; there
may be a "fit" between government and people. Under this
view, other governments must respect even a tyrannical regime
if the dictator is, at least, the result of a domestic political pro-
cess with a distinctive culture and history. We must allow that
local culture and history to determine its own political and so-
cial forces.
In the case of Iraq, the lack of "fit" between the government
and the people was readily apparent. 345 This was not ordinary
oppression. Rather, millions of people behaved cautiously, fear-
ing that any irregularity would bring the police. There were
thousands of political imprisonments, hundreds of tortures, and
forced relocation of vast segments of the population.346 Evi-
dently, citizens tolerated the regime because they were afraid.
The systematic scale of deprivation of basic human rights ap-
pears to have risen to the level of crimes against humanity. 347
When murders, tortures, and imprisonments go unchecked, and
their perpetrators are treated as if they are legitimate leaders,
the common humanity of all of us is tarnished. If we fail to in-
tervene in cases like this, if we acknowledge rights but turn our
340 Id. at 214.
341 Id. at 212.
342 Id.
343 Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
344 Walzer, supra note 339, at 212.
345 Id.
346 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 156-58.
347 See id. at 156.
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backs on their enforcement, we fail to take human rights seri-
ously; instead, we raise politics above moral theory.
We do not live in a Machiavellian world in which interna-
tional politics is best understood as an autonomous realm of
power in which the actions of nations are neither motivated by
ethical considerations nor subject to ethical judgment. In order
to meet what appears to be a permissive, if not obligatory duty
of states under this emergent norm of customary international
law, it may well be crucial to effect a regime-change in states
that are subjected to humanitarian crises such as genocide and
other crimes against humanity. Thus, the portion of the objec-
tive of Operation Iraqi Freedom to affect a regime-change,
under the circumstances of the tyrannical regime of Saddam
Hussein, appears to be supportable by the doctrine of humani-
tarian intervention. The United States removed a tyrannical
regime as it had done in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989.
Moreover, the United States set an important example that
should give pause to regimes in other countries such as North
Korea or Cuba; where ruling dictators keep themselves secure
against popular uprising by the application of summary brutal-
ity and imprisonment of political dissidents. They can no longer
feel impervious from foreign humanitarian intervention.
If the international community refuses to intervene in
cases of pervasive human rights abuses such as genocide and
ethnic cleansing by sticking doggedly to the old paradigm of
non-intervention, and the world community fails to create a
moral consensus among them, then their lack of action is tanta-
mount to an endorsement of the abuses. It is clear today that
all leaders of the world have certain deontological constraints
on how they treat their citizens. Thus, the international com-
munity has the moral responsibility to stop instances of human
rights abuses from occurring, through diplomatic and political
means if possible, and by military means if necessary.
XI. CONCLUSION
The U.N. Charter, even interpreted elastically, does not
support the Bush Doctrine of anticipatory self-defense in Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom, for any of its three enunciated purposes: to
disarm the regime from harboring weapons of mass destruction,
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to eradicate terrorist cells that are sponsored or tolerated by the
state, or to effect a regime-change.
Yet nations have the inherent right to protect citizens from
preventable harm, both within and without state borders. The
modern threat to world peace stems not from one particular or-
ganization, but from the convergence of weapons of mass de-
struction, rogue states, and international terrorism. 348 Clearly,
the United States is the object of ill will on the part of terrorists
who subscribe to radical forms of religious fanaticism, as evi-
denced by the terrorist plot that resulted in the attacks of Sep-
tember 11th. The danger of terrorism and rogue regimes is a
threat to the whole world.
We need rules suited to the new threats of the 21st Century.
Iraqi weapons posed too serious a threat to await the outcome of
protracted negotiation and compromise. While the United Na-
tions has been a forum in which the propriety of international
responses to terrorism has been debated, its attempts to curb
terrorism have been "patchy and often ineffective." 349 By con-
sidering the real threat of weapons of mass destruction and
continued Iraqi support of international terrorism, the United
States could not afford to be constrained by the politics of the
U.N. Security Council.350 The veto power in the Security Coun-
cil was too great an obstacle to reduce the proliferation of such
weapons. 351 In reality, some members of the U.N. Security
Council use the veto power to further their economic interests.
Iraq has cultivated cunning liaisons with France, Russia, and
China. 35 2 These relationships complicated U.N. attempts to
strengthen weapons inspections. 353
For many years, scholars have observed that the U.N.
Charter system is no longer effective to vouchsafe international
348 See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and
the American People, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001) (The war
on terror "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped and defeated .... From this day forward, any nation that continues to
harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile
regime.").
349 Anne-Marie Slaughter, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 1, 11 (2002).
350 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 208.
351 See id.
352 See id. at 186.
353 See id. at 208.
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peace and security.354 Since 1945, the U.N. Security Council
has rarely authorized the use of military force, and no standing
U.N. military has ever been established. 355 States that have
been the victim of threats to their peace and security have not
been able to rely on the U.N. Security Council to intervene on
their behalf.3 56
The U.N. Charter's policy of non-intervention in interna-
tional relations, based on the principle of Article 2(4) that states
must refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory
and independence of other states, has been violated countless
times since its inception in 1945. 35 7 Moreover, the U.N.'s stance
against humanitarian intervention has failed to become part of
customary international law.358 Clearly, states have chosen to
reject the strict limitations on self-defense in Article 51 in favor
of a more permissive norm that allows recourse to force in a
variety of circumstances. It allows recourse not only in re-
sponse to an armed attack or a threatened attack, but response
to threatened or actual attacks by terrorists, a disproportionate
response of taking retaliatory measures, and to effect regime-
changes in cases where a tyrannical leader threatens world
peace. 359
A new paradigm of international law on the use of force is
supportable and valid, given the dramatic shift of international
relations since the U.N. Charter was established in 1945. We
live in "an age of uniquely destructive weaponry. '360 In the face
of the threat of rogue states that sponsor terrorists or develop
weapons of mass destruction, the duty of states to confront this
danger is a strategic and moral imperative which international
law should embrace.
In other fields of public policy, such as medicine, the idea of
a preventive principle is extensively advocated, and, in many
situations there is a strong preference for preventive action over
mere remedial steps. The advantage of an ounce of prevention
354 See id. at 203.
355 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 203.
356 See Id.
357 See Id.
358 See id. at 196.
359 See id. at 181.
360 Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During
Peace and War, 5 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 231, 239 (1992).
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is proverbial. Preventive medicine, for example, has tremen-
dous support and has enjoyed tremendous development in re-
cent years.
Laws must bear some relation to practice or they cannot
regulate conduct effectively. Laws that impose unrealistic stan-
dards are likely to be violated and ultimately forgotten. The
Bush Doctrine does not seek to defend itself by appealing to Ar-
ticle 51 itself. It seeks to show that Article 51 is no longer an
authoritative rule, and thereby not weakening that rule, but
complementing it by carving out an exception to the principle of
non-intervention. Military intervention in Operation Iraqi
Freedom was not so much a strategic option as it was a strategic
mandate. Inaction or containment, bearing in mind Hussein's
threat, could have resulted in irreversible damage.
Critics of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, or pre-
ventive war, warn that it runs the risk of offering states carte
blanche authority to use military might against hypothetical
threats or mere suspicion. 361 These critics argue that, before all
other avenues are exhausted, "[e]very unfriendly or unsavory
government trying to develop unconventional weapons that
could conceivably fall into terrorist hands is now, in effect, a
declared enemy of the United States and a potential target of an
eventual American attack."362 Critics may also argue that the
doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is open to abuse, likely to
result in selective and self-interested action, or as pretence for
other aims such as conquest. 363 These objections may be coun-
361 See Posteraro, supra note 5, at 202.
362 Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at A20.
363 Statements by Administration Officials have been proffered to ally such
fears. Aides to President Bush claim they do not intend to make Iraq the first of a
series of preventive wars. They claim that diplomacy can work to persuade North
Korea to give up its nuclear weapons programs, that intensive inspections can
work to eliminate nuclear stockpiles in Iran, and that threats and incentives can
work to prevent Syria from engaging in state sponsored terrorism and from foster-
ing a guerrilla movement in Iraq. See David E. Sanger, Viewing the War as a
Lesson to the World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, B1. Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell said, "I think it's a bit of an overstatement to say that now this one's pock-
eted, on to the next place." Id. at Bll. A senior advisor of Mr. Powell's said that
Mr. Powell had cautioned the administration against any public talk of a "domino
effect" arising from Operation Iraqi Freedom. See id. The advisor said that Mr.
Powell's view "is that we've made enough enemies in the past five months, and we
don't need to go looking for another fight." Id. President Bush's national security
advisor, Condoleezza Rice, deflected criticism that Operation Iraqi Freedom is a
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tered by clearly identifying the conditions for intervention so as
to ensure that there are safeguards against the slippery slope of
abuse. I would suggest the following model to govern anticipa-
tory self-defense to cover cases of rogue states that sponsor or
harbor terrorists or which develop weapons of mass destruction:
1. The injury feared should consist of a tyrannical regime
that harbors or develops weapons of mass destruction and/or
passively or actively harbors, sponsors or tolerates terrorist
cells within its borders. There is compelling evidence (a stan-
dard greater than a preponderance of evidence and lower than
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard) that the leader of the
regime has committed crimes against humanity.
2. Diplomatic efforts will have failed to reach a swift solu-
tion, and the leader of the regime has refused to take meaning-
ful steps to remove the threats stated in 1.
3. The injury feared must be highly probable, if not certain,
to occur in the absence of preventive action, and the imminence
of the threat must be close in time or ongoing.
4. The probable damage to be done by any preventive ac-
tion should be markedly less than the anticipated injury.
5. Fair warning should be given to the regime of the immi-
nence of military action so as to allow for a voluntary last ditch
effort of the leadership to step down.
6. The principle of proportionality in this context implies
that adequate control should be taken to prevent the military
action from becoming excessive, but at the same time the princi-
ple of proportionality, together with the doctrine of humanita-
rian intervention, should allow for deploying military force in
order to disarm the regime, disable the regime's weapons of
mass destruction, and effect a regime-change.
From a procedural perspective, collective action by the Se-
curity Council would be preferable to unilateral intervention.
Failing that, a "coalition of the willing" would be preferable to
unilateral action, because unilateral action tends to elicit the
acrimonious cries of imperialism, hegemony, and similar unde-
first step to new conflict, in saying, "You don't treat every case with the identical
remedy," and that "there are lots of ways" of dealing with rogue states that harbor
terrorists or develop weapons of mass destruction. She added, "In North Korea,
we're dealing with the issue in one particular way; with Iran, we're dealing with it
in other ways." Id.
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sirable practices that detract from international support.364 On
the other hand, some believe that the world's sole superpower
"should be unashamed, unapologetic, uncompromising Ameri-
can constitutional hegemonists." 365
The world's lone superpower may need to engage in unilat-
eral anticipatory self-defense in exceptional circumstances
where there is compelling evidence of state sponsorship of ter-
rorism or the development of weapons of mass destruction by a
tyrannical regime. Such circumstances include when peaceful
avenues for settling the dispute have been exhausted, the veto
power has rendered the Security Council incapable of taking or
authorizing coercive action, the action is undertaken with the
support of other states for air space and territorial rights, and
when there is at least non-opposition of the majority of other
states.
It may take time before the Bush Doctrine receives the sort
of "long-term, sustained acceptance ... throughout the commu-
nity of nations" that permits this state practice to truly be a rule
that is recognized as customary international law. 366 If the doc-
trine of anticipatory self-defense comes to be a part of custom-
ary international law, it would supplement or supersede the
literal text of Article 51.367 I believe that anticipatory self-de-
fense under the Bush Doctrine, in the circumstances of Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom, already has entered the domain of
customary international law. Whether that is true will depend
on future experience in the practices of states and opinio juris.
We should not forget the memorable words of John Wyant,
the World War II era American Ambassador to the Court of St.
James. He said, "What we're learning in this conflict is that the
next time we must not wait until the sun is gleaming on their
bayonets." 368 We may finally be witnessing, to use the words of
364 Franck, supra note 28, at 57.
365 John R. Bolton, Is There Really "Law" in International Affairs?, 10 TRANs-
NAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 48 (2000). A passage by Charles Krauthammer in
Time captures this "unapologetic" view of hegemony: "America is no mere interna-
tional citizen. It is the dominant power in the world, more dominant than any
since Rome. Accordingly, America is in a position to reshape norms, alter expecta-
tions and create new realities. How? By unapologetic and implacable demonstra-
tions of will." TIME, Mar. 5, 2001, at 42.
366 Glennon, supra note 34, at 193.
367 See Franck, supra note 28, at 58.
368 Lambert, supra note 77, at 18.
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Woodrow Wilson in his address to Congress declaring war in
1917, "the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that
the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong
shall be observed among nations and their governments that
are observed among the individual citizens of individual
states."
369
369 Quoted by HANS J. MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN VS. POWER POLITICS 180
(Univ. of Chic. Press, 1946).
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